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This dissertation contains three chapters that empirically examine the interac-
tions among economic variables from three different fields: labor economics,
macroeconomics, and financial markets. This dissertation lies at the intersec-
tion of these three fields, and the underlying theme is the empirical investiga-
tion that enhances our understanding of the mechanisms that drive economic
activities that we observe today.
The first chapter examines how labor market composition and macroeco-
nomic conditions affect each other. A dual labor market structure that consists
of “permanent jobs” and “temporary jobs” is common in many Continental Eu-
ropean countries and in Japan, and over the last two decades, the share of tem-
porary workers in these countries has increased markedly. In this chapter, I
demonstrate through an analysis of Japanese household panel survey data that
permanent workers experience faster wage growth than temporary workers.
Then, building a search and matching model of dual labor market with endoge-
nous human capital accumulation, I show that, in the presence of two different
types of jobs with different rates of return to experience, a slowing of the eco-
nomic growth rate in a dual labor market structure can prompt a substantial
shift in the composition of jobs.
The second chapter proposes a nonparametric method for studying the time
series properties of macroeconomic variables. In particular, I focus on a class of
learning networks called the Radial Basis Function (RBF). The main advantage
of the RBF method is its flexibility and that it requires minimal functional-form
assumptions. To assess the potential value of the RBF method, I simulate data
points using a nonlinear New-Keynesian (NK) DSGE model and show that the
RBF time series can uncover the nonlinear NK structure from simulated data
observations whose length is as small as 300 (quarters). I then compare the out-
of-sample prediction performance of the resulting network formula with other
traditional time series methods, i.e., Vector-Autoregression and Bayesian VAR
models. Finally, I apply this RBF time series method to US macroeconomic data
from 1960-2010.
The third chapter studies the link between the probability of default implied
by Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads and the final prices of the defaulted
bonds as established at the CDS settlement auctions. We observe that the post-
default recovery rates at the observed spreads imply markets were often ‘sur-
prised” by the credit event. We find that the prices of the bonds that are de-
liverable at the auctions imply probabilities of default that are systematically
different than the default probabilities estimated prior to the event of default
using standard methodologies. We discuss the implications for CDS pricing
models. We analyze the discrepancy between the actual and theoretical CDS
spreads and we find it is significantly associated both to the CDS market mi-
crostructure at the time of the settlement auction and to the general macroeco-
nomic background. We discuss the potential for strategic bidding behavior at
the CDS settlement auctions.
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CHAPTER 1
GROWTH AND LABOR MARKET COMPOSITION
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies the effect of the rate of economic growth on the composi-
tion of the labor market when that market consists of two types of employment,
which are referred to as “permanent employment” and “temporary employ-
ment.”1 In many Continental European countries and in Japan, the share of tem-
porary workers among all employees has increased markedly over the last two
decades. This trend is commonly attributed to changes in labor market regula-
tions that enforce stronger job protection or legislative decisions that facilitate
the creation of temporary jobs.2 While these legislative factors play some impor-
tant role, this paper argues that, under a certain condition, a slowdown of eco-
nomic growth alone can create a considerable increase in the share of temporary
workers without any changes in legislation. The key mechanism hinges on the
difference in the rate of wage growth between permanent jobs and temporary
jobs. In particular, when the rate of wage growth is greater for permanent jobs
than for temporary jobs and, at the same time, the economy grows at a slower
rate, the value of future wage growth is discounted at a higher rate. This results
in holding jobs that promises fast wage growth (permanent jobs) less valuable
today, leading workers to choose temporary jobs rather than permanent ones.
Simple exercise of comparing the changes in real GDP growth rates and the
1How these types of employment are referenced in the literature varies. Examples include
“Good jobs” versus “Bad jobs”, “Standard jobs” versus “Non-standard jobs”, and “Regular em-
ployment” versus “Fixed-term employment”.
2See [17] and [13].
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Figure 1.1: Part-time employment rate and real GDP growth rate
Changes in 10-year average part-time employment rate and changes in 10-year average GDP
growth rate: average over 1985-1994 versus average over 2005-2014
Source for part-time employment rate: OECD data, Source for real GDP: OECD Statistics
Notes: due to data availability, averages are over 1) 1986-1995 for New Zealand and Portugal; 2) over 1987-1995 for
Netherlands; 3) over 1988-1995 for Turkey; and 4) over 1989-1994 for Finland, South Korea, and Norway.
changes in part-time employment rates for OECD counties reveals the primi-
tive relationship between the GDP growth rates and the part-time employment
rates.3 Figure 1.1 plots the percentage change in the 10-year average of the part-
time employment rate between 1985-1994 average and 2005-2014 average on
the vertical axis.45 The horizontal axis of Figure 1.1 shows the change in the
10-year average of annual GDP growth rates between 1985-1994 average and
3United States is excluded from Figure 1.1 because part-time employment rate is not avail-
able for the US in OECD data.
4Part-time employment is defined by OECD data as follows ”part-time employment is ...
people in employment (including both employees and self-employed) who usually work less
than 30 hours per week in their main job. Employed people are those aged 15 and over who
report that they have worked in gainful employment for at least one hour in the previous week
or who had a job but were absent from work during the reference week while having a formal
job attachment.
5% change in part-time rate = ((average part-time rate between 2005 and 2014) - (average
part-time rate between 1985 and 1994))/(average part-time rate between 1985 and 1994) ×100.
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2005-2014 average.6 Even though this analysis is primitive, Figure 1.1 clearly
exhibits a negative relationship between the change in part-time employment
rate and change in real GDP growth rate, suggesting that as the GDP growth
slows down, the share of part-time workers tends to increase. Part-time work-
ers in Figure 1.1 is simply defined as workers who work less than 30 hours
a week, and the definition of temporary workers that I use in the remainder of
the paper considers more characteristics of jobs including opportunities for pro-
motion and rates of wage growth. However, the negative relationship exhibited
in Figure 1.1 hints at the negative relationship between the share of temporary
workers and the long-run growth rate of an economy. The goal of this paper is
to offer an explanation for this negative relationship.
This paper focuses on Japan because: (i) the country experienced both pe-
riods of fast growth before 1990 and slow growth after 1990; (ii) the presence
of two distinctively different types of jobs is well documented7; and (iii) during
the slow growth period of the last two decades, the share of temporary employ-
ment has nearly doubled from 20% to 40%. Figure 1.2 shows four key Japanese
economic statistics between 1980 and 2015. First, Japan experienced periods of
both high growth prior to 1990 and low growth post-1990. The slow growth
period after 1990 is sometimes referred to as the lost decades. The difference
between the two periods is evident in the first panel (1.2a). The dotted lines in-
dicate the average Japanese real GDP growth prior to and post 1990, which are
4.47% and 0.90%, respectively.
During the period of slow growth, the share of temporary workers among
6Change in real GDP growth rate = (average real GDP growth rate between 2005 and 2014) -
(average real GDP growth rate between 1985 and 1994).
7Precise definitions of “permanent jobs” and “temporary jobs” are given in Section 1.3.
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Figure 1.2: Japanese Economy
(a) Real GDP (percent change) (b) Proportion of Temporary Workers (percent)
(c) Unemployment Rate (percent) (d) Real Interest Rates (short-term)
Source for 1.2a: SNA (National Cabinet of Japan)
Source for 1.2b: ”The Special Survey of the Labour Force Survey” from 1984 to 2001,
”Labour Force Survey (Detailed Tabulation)” since 2002
Source for 1.2c: Labor Force Survey
Source for 1.2d: World Bank database
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all employees doubled from 20% to close to 40%, as illustrated in panel 1.2b.8
The share of temporary workers increases even when the sample is restricted
to male employees and male employees of working age. This outcome implies
that the increasing trend is likely to persist even after factors such as greater
participation of female workers and aging demographics are removed. Interest-
ingly, the most drastic change is observed for male workers between the ages
of 25 and 34. The increasing trend in the share of temporary workers became a
significant concern for the Japanese public when it was reported that temporary
workers earn less wages, receive less generous benefits, expect very low rate of
wage growth, and experience weaker job security than permanent workers do.
Panels (1.2c) and (1.2d) show the unemployment rate and real interest rate
for Japan from 1980 to 2015. The unemployment rate increased from an aver-
age 2.46% before 1990 to an average 3.99% after 1990. The slow growth period
appears to be associated with higher rate of unemployment. The average real
interest rate decreased from 4.45% between 1980 and 1990 to about 3% after
1990. The reduction in the real interest rate means that the future incomes are
discounted at a lower rate, which works against effect of the slow growth on the
labor market. The combined effect of slower growth rate and lower real inter-
est rates is thus ambiguous. To evaluate the impact of both effects, I propose a
search and matching model that quantify these opposite forces.
Motivated by the observations described above, I build a search and match-
ing model of a dual labor market that is populated by heterogeneous workers
whose skills evolve endogenously according to their employment status. The
model incorporates a dual labor market that is designed to capture two distinc-
8Data are retrieved from the Labor Force Survey, whose survey design is similar to that of
the Current Population Survey in the U.S. Survey was redesigned in 2001. An overall increasing
trend in the share of temporary workers is evident across the entire population.
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tive labor markets for permanent jobs and temporary jobs. Workers are born as
initially unemployed and with randomly assigned skills. Depending on their
skill levels, they decide to search either in the permanent labor market or in the
temporary labor market. In choosing which market to search for, unemployed
workers face the following trade-off. If the unemployed workers search in the
permanent market, they have a chance of finding jobs that enable them to fully
utilize their own skills and that ensure greater job-security and on-the-job train-
ing. However, the probability of finding such jobs is low. In contrast, if the
unemployed workers search in the temporary market, they have a higher prob-
ability of finding jobs. However, workers holding these jobs cannot utilize their
own skills; instead they employ a technology that is common to all temporary
jobs. In addition, the temporary jobs provide weaker job-security and less on-
the-job training than the permanent jobs do. Given the parameter values that I
estimate in Section 1.6, low skilled workers find it optimal to search for tempo-
rary jobs while high skilled workers search for permanent jobs; the observation
that is consistent with the data.9 Thus, in my model the existence of temporary
jobs is motivated by the difference in workers’ skill levels.
Given this trade-off between permanent jobs and temporary jobs, I pose the
following question: How does low growth affect labor market composition?
Suppose that an economy enters a slow growth steady state. Slower growth
means that future income is discounted at a higher rate. This reduces the con-
tinuation value of a job because the cost of setting up the initial employment
relationship is paid now; in contrast, the benefit of the employment relation-
ship accrues in the future.10 However, when the workers’ skills are allowed
to increase on the job and wages are negotiated during each period, the value
9See Section 1.3.3.
10This effect is often called the “capitalization effect,” which is highlighted by [3] and [60].
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of permanent jobs decreases at a much faster rate than the rate at which the
value of temporary jobs decreases. The value of a permanent job is dispropor-
tionately affected because the permanent workers receive on-the-job training
and have a higher probability of wage growth. In a slow growth economy, the
present value of future wage growth goes down because the discount rate is
higher. Faced with the low job-finding probability and the decreasing benefit of
permanent jobs, some workers who would search for permanent jobs in a fast
growth economy will, in a slow growth economy, search for temporary jobs.
Thus, the share of temporary workers increases in the slow growth economy.
The extent to which the share of temporary workers increases depends on the
rate of skill accumulation for the permanent workers. In fact, when human cap-
ital accumulation is not allowed, slower economic growth has no impact on the
composition of the labor market.
When estimated with the Japanese labor market dataset, my model at-
tributes as much as 64.3% of the observed increase in the share of temporary
workers in Japan to its slow growth. I also investigate how firing costs affect the
composition of jobs. I find that reducing the cost of firing permanent workers re-
sults in a decrease in the share of temporary workers and a low unemployment
rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews
the relevant literature. Section 1.3 provides background information about the
Japanese labor market and it defines “permanent jobs” and “temporary jobs” in
the context of the Japanese labor market. Section 1.4 illustrates the mechanism
using a simple model. Section 1.5 describes the full model. Section 1.6 lays out
the calibration strategy, Section 1.7 shows the result, and Section 1.8 concludes.
7
1.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on growth and unemployment. A num-
ber of papers have studied the effect of growth on unemployment in a search
and matching framework ([3], [60], [61]). One of the most heated debates has
centered on the degree to which the new workers embody new technology. If
all the technological progress is embodied by new workers, then growth and
unemployment are positively correlated. In contrast, if technological growth is
disembodied, meaning that both new and existing workers embody technolog-
ical progress, then growth and unemployment will be negatively correlated. To
address this issue, [61] evaluate a model that features embodied and disembod-
ied technology, capitalization, and creative destruction effects. They conclude
that embodied technology and creative destruction do not play a significant role
in explaining the steady-state unemployment rate. Following their argument,
this paper uses a search and matching model with disembodied technological
progress.
The use of temporary workers in Japan has gained attention in recent years.
[7] empirically examined factors that are most responsible for the rise of tem-
porary employment in Japan. They found that changes in labor force and in-
dustrial composition account for only a quarter of the increase in temporary
workers and that the decline of the importance of long-term employment helps
to explain this trend. In a structural estimation of the career choices of young
workers, [26] focus on young workers who began their careers as temporary
workers. They conclude that in Japan starting a career as a temporary worker
has a lasting effect on the welfare of young workers.
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The paper builds on the framework of [34], who proposes a search model
where the allocation of workers across different labor markets is endogenously
determined. He then studies how this allocation changes over the business
cycle. In contrast, I study how the allocation of workers across distinct jobs
changes across growth regimes. In doing so, I identify a separate mechanism
by which the impact of changes in growth rates on the allocation of workers
depends on the difference in the rates of wage growth across permanent and
temporary jobs. This paper is also related to research undertaken by [1], who
developed a search and matching model in which high-wage (good jobs) and
low-wage (bad jobs) jobs can coexist. Observing the increasing share of tempo-
rary employment in Continental European countries, [5] investigated the role of
increased temporary employment in a general equilibrium search and match-
ing model. He concluded that temporary jobs increase unemployment, reduce
output, and raise productivity. [16] studied the relationship between financial
constraints and the labor market composition of permanent and temporary jobs.
They found that when firms are likely to be financially constrained, they choose
to hire more temporary workers. Examining the experience of labor market
reform in France, [11] discuss the effect of allowing firms to hire workers on
fixed-term contracts. They conclude that the main effect of policy reform is a
high turnover in entry-level jobs, which leads to higher unemployment.
In the area of the growth and the composition of jobs in the economy, this pa-
per is most closely related to [53] and [72]. In a search and matching framework,
[72] claims that through the capitalization effect, the share of temporary work-
ers increases during times of low technological growth. [53] builds a search and
matching model to quantify the strength of the capitalization effect in Japan.
Although our papers are similar, his mechanism crucially depends on the sub-
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stitutability between goods produced by permanent workers and goods pro-
duced by temporary workers. As the rate of substitution between permanent
goods and temporary goods decreases, the effects of a change in trend growth
on the composition of jobs also decreases. Given how difficult it is to measure
the rate of substitution between permanent goods and temporary goods in the
real world, I propose an alternative mechanism that relies on the difference in
the rate of wage growth between the two types of employment by integrating
heterogeneous workers’ skills that evolve dynamically. Taking skill accumula-
tion into account, I find that the effect of the rate of growth on labor market
composition changes dramatically.
This paper is also related to a line of research that studies the effect of layoff
regulations. On the theoretical side, [47] summarizes the literature by stating
that the effects of layoff regulations on employment vary greatly depending on
the assumptions of models. Early general equilibrium analyses by [15], [32] and
[65] display a negative effect of lay-off costs on employment, while later gen-
eral equilibrium models by [6] and [55] display positive employment effects of
lay-off costs. In search and matching models that employ the standard assump-
tion of a constant relative split in the match surplus between firms and workers,
layoff costs tend to increase employment by reducing labor reallocation; in con-
trast, because of diminished private returns to work, employment effects tend to
be negative in models that feature employment lotteries. In addition, empirical
work (e.g. [36]; [10]; [4]) are inconclusive about the effect of layoff regulation.
Focusing on the impact of layoff regulation on job composition rather than the
level of employment, [17] build a model that explains the choice between per-
manent and temporary jobs. They argue that job protection law causes a large
substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs. My paper also predicts that
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a stronger job protection increases the share of temporary workers. The dif-
ference between my paper and theirs lies at how in each model the existence
of temporary jobs is motivated. [17] motivate the presence of temporary jobs
by assuming that jobs are different in their expected life-span of productivity
(some jobs are expected to become unproductive within months (i.e. seasonal
jobs) while other jobs are expected to be productive for years). In contrast, I mo-
tivate the presence of temporary jobs on the basis of the difference in workers’
skills.
1.3 “Permanent Job” and “Temporary Job” in the Japanese La-
bor Market
This section outlines the institutional background of the Japanese labor market,
whose composition is the focus of this paper. In particular, I describe standard
Japanese labor market practices that many believe differ from US practices, and
I define “permanent employment” and “temporary employment” in the context
of Japanese labor market practices. [41] summarize as follows a set of standard
practices that are coherently observed in Japanese labor market:
1. Strong employment protection against lay-offs, which leads to a long job
tenure.
2. Employee involvement in problem solving activities from the bottom-
up, which encourages workers to exert discretionary effort and gain local
knowledge.
3. Careful screening and extensive on-the-job training that increases worker
11
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The workers who are covered by these standard practices I call “permanent
workers.” Another group of Japanese workers has an employment relationship
that does not conform to these practices. They constitute the secondary seg-
ment of the Japanese labor market, and I refer to their situation as “temporary
employment.” These workers often are paid lower wages, receive less gener-
ous benefits, enjoy less control over their work, and have weaker employment
protection than permanent workers ([41]). In this regard, the permanent and
temporary jobs of the Japanese labor market are similar to the “good jobs” and
“bad jobs” that are described in the good job and bad job literature and “per-
manent jobs” and “temporary jobs” in the literature that study European labor
markets 12.
I define “temporary employees” as workers who fall into one of the follow-
ing categories: (i) part-time worker, (ii) dispatched workers, (iii) contract work-
ers, (iv) commission staff, or (v) other types of workers who are not permanent
employees. This method of classification is consistent with the use of the term in
the Labor Force Survey 13. Under this system of classification some temporary
workers work for more than 40 hours a week and some permanent workers can
work less than 40 hours a week.
In the following sub-sections, I document three empirical facts about per-
manent and temporary workers: (i) the rate of wage growth is higher for per-
11[41] also highlighted the fact that other Japanese employment practices are distinguished by
two additional variables: (4) A robust scheme to share information through unions so that infor-
mation asymmetry between employees and between employees and management is avoided;
and (5) Incentive schemes that include employee ownership of the firms and profit sharing,
which encourage workers and the firm to develop a sense of shared interests.
12See, for example, [1] and [40]
13The survey design is similar to the U.S. Current Population Survey
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manent workers, (ii) on average the job tenure of permanent workers is greater
than that of temporary workers, and (iii) people with high school or middle
school degrees are more likely to become temporary workers while people with
college or higher degrees are more likely to become permanent workers.
The following empirical findings are based largely on two datasets: the
Japanese Household Panel Survey (JHPS) and the Keio Household Panel Sur-
vey (KHPS). The KHPS is an annual panel household survey of 4000 households
that was recorded each year from 2004 to 2014. The JHPS is another annual
panel household survey of about 4000 households that was recorded each year
from 2009 to 2014. I focus on the income of household heads aged 25 to 60
years who were recorded at least 4 times (waves). This criterion leaves us with
about 2000 observations each year from 2004 to 2008 and about 3200 observa-
tions from 2009 to 2013. The classification of permanent worker and temporary
worker follows the criterion described above.
1.3.1 Wage growth
First, I establish that there is a difference in the rate of wage growth between
permanent workers and temporary workers. To identify the return on working
at the same firm for additional year, I run a regression of log hourly wage on
job tenure, job tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, and
their interaction terms with indicator for permanent workers. Additionally, the
regression includes the following control variables: age, age squared, individual
fixed effects, and fixed effects for year and industry. Let 1P be the indicator for
permanent employment, then the regression can be specified as follows:
13
wagei,t =α0 + α1tenure + α2tenure
2 + α3work ex. + α4work ex.
2
β01P + β1tenure × 1P + β2tenure2 × 1P + β3work ex. × 1P + β4work ex.2 × 1P
+ Xi,tγ + i,t
Our parameters of interest are β1, β2, β3, and β4. If the wage growth rate is
different across two types of employment, the β’s should be jointly insignificant.
The result is shown below in Table 1.1. First, the p-value of the F-test indicates
that the null of joint insignificance of β’s is rejected at 5% significance level,
meaning that the annual rate of return for working at the same firm is different
between permanent workers and temporary workers. For permanent workers
with 5 years of job tenure and 10 years of work experience14, for example, the
annual return of staying at the current employer is 6.88%.15 In contrast, the an-
nual return of working at the current firm is 5.24% for temporary workers with
the same years of job tenure and work experience. The difference in the rates
of wage growth for this example is about 1.63%, and this difference is statisti-
cally significant. The result is consistent with common practices documented in
Section 1.3 wherein permanent workers accumulate local knowledge within a
firm and receive extensive on-the-job training; temporary workers, in contract,
do not.
14Aprrox. 30 years old who switched job once
15After removing the effects of year, age, industry.
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Table 1.1: Return on working
Permanent Temporary
Avg. years of job tenure 14.10 yrs 5.11 yrs
Avg. years of work exp. 21.40 yrs 14.94 yrs
Avg. years of job tenure for both types 12.81 yrs
Avg. years of work exp. for both types 20.68 yrs
Annual wage growth for workers
with 5 yrs of tenure and 10 yrs of exp. 5.24% 6.88%
Difference in wage growth for workers
with 5 yrs of tenure and 10 yrs of exp. 1.63%
Annual wage growth for avg. workers
with 12.8 yrs of tenure and 20.68 yrs of exp. 4.05% 5.14%
Difference in wage growth for avg. workers
with 12.81 yrs of tenure and 20.68 yrs of exp. 1.08%
Observations 9,524
R2 0.0754
p-value for F-test
(β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0)
0.0154
Data are from KHPS and JHPS, 2004-2014. For each year, the sample is restricted to workers
who continued working at the same firm from the previous year.
1.3.2 Job tenure
Next, I examine differences in the job tenure of permanent workers and tem-
porary workers. The data are obtained from the JHPS and KHPS datasets. The
data show that permanent workers stay with the same employers considerably
longer than temporary workers. In 2006, the average length of stay with the
same employer was 14.163 years (standard deviation is 11.169) for both types of
workers. More specifically, the average length of the job tenure of permanent
workers was 15.51 (standard deviation is 11.098) years, whereas for temporary
workers it was 5.04 years (standard deviation 6.34). The test for the difference
in the mean rejects the null that across the two types of workers the means are
equal at the 1% significance level. In summary, permanent workers on average
stay with the same employers about three times longer than temporary workers.
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1.3.3 Educational attainment
The assumptions in my model induce low skilled workers to search for tem-
porary jobs and high-skilled workers to search for permanent jobs; I present
an observation that is consistent with this prediction. Since workers’ innate
productive capacities are difficult to measure, I use workers’ educational attain-
ment as a proxy for their skills. Figure 1.3 displays in the case of male employ-
ees the shares of temporary workers who have different levels of educational
attainment. The share of temporary workers is highest among employees with
middle or high school degrees (26% in 2012). In contrast, the share of temporary
workers is lowest among employees who have college or higher degrees (12%
in 2012). While this is not a perfect measure of workers’ skills, it hints at the dif-
ference in the workers’ traits across the two types of employment as measured
by educational achievement.
Figure 1.3: Share of temporary workers by the level of education for men in 2012
Data from Employment Status Survey, 2012
Having documented these facts, I present my model in the following section.
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1.4 Simple Model
For an illustration of a mechanism, I first build a simple model that features
two types jobs. For convenience, I refer to the first type of job a permanent job
and the second type of the job a temporary job. These two types of jobs are
identical except that wages for permanent workers exhibit growth while wages
for temporary workers remain fixed for their entire career. Workers employed
in the permanent jobs initially receive wages, wperm. In the next period, their
wages increase to w′perm, which will then be fixed for the rest of their careers. I
further assume that once attached, the employed workers do not separate from
the jobs.
Besides the wage growth that is specific to the permanent workers, the
wages of both sectors will increases at the common rate of γX, which reflects
the growth rate of the economy.
Let Wperm denote the present value of a permanent worker. Then,
Wperm = wperm + βγX
w′perm
1 − βγX , (1.1)
where β is a discount factor.
Temporary workers do not experience wage growth. Thus, the value of a
temporary worker is:
Wtemp =
wtemp
1 − βγX (1.2)
An unemployed worker is indifferent between searching for a permanent
job and a temporary job if the following condition holds:
Wperm = Wtemp
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This condition requires the following wage structure: w′perm > wtemp > wperm
Suppose now that the technological growth that is common to both types of
workers decreases, γX ↓. Then, values of both permanent workers and tempo-
rary workers decrease. For the unemployed workers to continue to be indiffer-
ent between choosing between permanent jobs and temporary jobs, the values
of a permanent worker and that of a temporary worker must both go down
at the same rate, dWperm/dγX = dWtemp/dγX. On the contrary, the unemployed
workers prefer temporary jobs if the value of permanent workers decreases at
a greater rate than than the rate at which the value of temporary workers de-
creases: dUperm/dγX > dUtemp/dγX.
It turns out that if the permanent jobs feature wage growth while the tem-
porary jobs do not, then the rate of reduction in the value of permanent jobs is
larger in response to the decrease in γ as follows:
dWperm
dγX
=
βw′perm
(1 − βγX)2 ((1 − βγX) + βγX) >
βwtemp
(1 − βγX)2 =
dWtemp
dγX
since w′perm > wtemp.
Because changes in the discount factor affects only through wages in the
future periods, the rate of response is larger for the permanent sector where fu-
ture wage is higher than the temporary wages. Thus, the unemployed workers
who were previously indifferent between permanent jobs and temporary jobs
now prefer to be employed in temporary jobs when γ decreases. This simple
model, however, does not take into account the general equilibrium effects of
a slow growth. Specifically, when more people search for temporary jobs, the
temporary labor market becomes tighter, which makes finding a temporary job
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more difficult and searching in the temporary labor market less attractive. Im-
portantly, the simple model also ignore the effects through the wages. To fully
evaluate the effects of a slow growth on the labor composition, I build a full
model in the following sections.
1.5 Full Model
1.5.1 Environment
The model builds on [34] who incorporates elements of the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model and the [48] model of human
capital accumulation and depreciation
The economy is populated by risk-neutral workers and firms. Each employ-
ment relationship consists of a worker-firm pair. Workers are born unemployed
and have skills that are drawn from a log-normal distribution: log(h) ∼ N(0, σ2h).
The skills of each worker dynamically evolve according to his or her employ-
ment status, as specified below.
Two labor markets comprise my model. The first is the permanent job mar-
ket and the second is the temporary job market. These two employment types
differ from one another in two respects: (i) while a firm must pay a firing cost to
dissolve a permanent match, there is no cost of dissolving a temporary match;
and (ii) permanent workers use their skills in the production process, in contrast
to temporary workers, who do not utilize their skills. I assume that firing costs
constitute waste rather than transfer to workers (i.e., administrative and legal
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costs).
Once an employment relationship is formed, firms produce goods according
to the following linear technologies:
y˜perm = X︸︷︷︸
labor-augumenting
technology
× h︸︷︷︸
skill level
, y˜temp = X︸︷︷︸
labor-augumenting
technology
× A︸︷︷︸
temporary
technology
I assume that while permanent workers can make use of their skills, tem-
porary workers use a technology that is commonly available to all temporary
workers. The productivity of temporary workers is fixed at A¯.16. To analyze
the effect of growth, I assume that there is a labor-augmenting technology, X.17
Additionally, I assume that all separations occur for exogenous reasons. The as-
sumption of exogenous separation is not necessary for the effect of slow growth
on job composition to be propagated.
That there is no on-the-job search reflects the fact that in Japan a direct transi-
tion from temporary employment to permanent employment is rare. [26], who
conducted a structural estimation of the career choices of young workers in
Japan, found that temporary employment is seldom a stepping stone to per-
manent employment. My assumption that there is no job-to-job transition is
consistent with the observed extremely long job tenure documented in Section
1.3.2. Finally, I focus on stationary stochastic equilibrium.
16This productivity structure for temporary workers implies that temporary jobs are “skill-
neutral”.
17See Section 1.5.3 and A.2 for more detail
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1.5.2 Labor Markets Construction
There are two labor markets. During each period, unemployed workers with
skill level, h, choose in which market to search for a job. The search is random
within the same market.
The match is formed according to a Cobb-Douglas function that takes job-
seekers and vacancies as factors of input. Let M denote the number of matches
and let u and v be the number of job-seekers and vacancies, respectively. The
match is formed according to the following:
M j = m ju jv
1−ψ
j where j ∈
{
perm, temp
}
, where m j is a constant match efficiency. The match efficiency is different across
two markets. For convenience, I define market tightness as the ratio of vacancies
per job-seeker: θ j = v j/u j. Then, the job-finding probability can be defined as
f (θj) = m¯jθ
1−ψ
j and the job-filling probability as q(θj) = m¯jθ
−ψ
j for j ∈
{
perm, temp
}
.
The presence of the firing cost changes the value functions of the permanent
workers and firms as well as the wage structure of the permanent workers. Fol-
lowing [55] and [63], I assume that firms that reject new permanent workers do
not have to pay firing costs because their employment relationships have not
yet started. Once they start working, the firms must pay firing costs when their
matches are destroyed. This setting gives rise to a two-tier wage structure for
permanent jobs, which is often described to as an “inside” wage and “outside”
wage ([44]). I denote wNperm to be the wage for a newly employed permanent
worker and wEperm to be the wage of an existing permanent worker. Because of
the presence of the two-tier wage structure, there have to be two value functions
for the permanent workers and jobs.
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1.5.3 Balanced Growth
Following [60] and [61], my model assumes disembodied technological growth.
I assume that there is a labor-augmenting technology, Xt that exhibits a steady
state rate of growth as γX = Xt+1/Xt for all t. Furthermore, I assume that all ex-
ogenous variables grow at the constant rate of γX. Thus, the cost of vacancy,
κ j, the unemployment income, b, and the firing cost, φ, for j ∈
{
perm, temp
}
all
grow at the rate of γX. Under this assumption, the economy is on a balanced
growth path. In the following sections, I present a model under which all vari-
ables are divided by X (i.e. yperm = y˜perm/X). For a detailed derivation, please
refer to Section A.2.
1.5.4 Human skill dynamics
The workers in my model are endowed with skills. The set of skills are mea-
sured between h and h, and each skill-level is located at ∆h distance from the oth-
ers. Human capital in my model evolves dynamically. Given that wages are ne-
gotiated each period, the wages grow as workers’ skills upgrade while on-the-
job. This is one way to capture the wage growth described in 1.3.1. According to
[64], in the U.S. there are two main sources for an observed earnings/experience
profile: (1) skill accumulation and (2) job search (including outside job offers).
In my model, workers increase their wages only by accumulating more skills.
My model ignores the wage growth from an on-the-job search because in Japan
the job-to-job transition rate is small. As noted in Section 1.3.1, the rate of wage
growth is different across the two types of employment. To capture the different
rate of wage growth, I denote piperm as the probability of a skill upgrade by ∆H
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for permanent workers and pitemp as the probability of a skill upgrade for tempo-
rary workers. Thus, during each period, pi j fraction of workers in sector j who
have an h skill-level upgrade their skills to h + ∆h during the next period.
In addition, unemployed workers face the probability of skill deterioration
with the probability, piu. Thus, for unemployed workers who have skill-level, h,
their skills go down to h − ∆h each period with the probability piu.
1.5.5 Value of Unemployment
Let U(h) denote the present value of an unemployed worker who has h skill-
level.
U(h) = b + β(1 − ν)γX maxE
[
Uperm(h′),Utemp(h′)
]
(1.3)
Unemployed workers first receive an unemployment income, b, and decide
whether to search in the permanent market or the temporary market.
Let Uperm(h) denote the present value of unemployed workers who seek em-
ployment in the permanent labor market, and let define Utemp(h) as the present
value of unemployed workers who search in the temporary market. Then,
Uperm(h) = f (θperm)(WNperm(h) − U(h)) + U(h), (1.4)
Utemp(h) = f (θtemp)(Wtemp(h) − U(h)) + U(h), (1.5)
where β = 1/R is the discount factor, ν is the exogenous probability of retirement,
and γX is the steady state rate of labor-augmenting technological growth.
Once the unemployed worker decides what market to search, the unem-
ployed worker finds a job with the probability f (θj) for j ∈
{
perm, temp
}
. If
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the unemployed worker could not find a job, then she will remain unemployed
when the next period starts.
For reasonable parameter values, all workers with a skill level above a given
cutoff h∗ choose to search in the permanent market because the value of search-
ing in the permanent market exceeds the value of searching in the temporary
market. Thus, for h > h∗, Uperm(h) > Utemp(h). Similarly, all workers below cutoff
h∗ find it optimal to search in the temporary market. An unemployed worker
who held a temporary job previously might find it optimal to search for a per-
manent job if, when he worked in the temporary job, he accumulated sufficient
skills. In contrast, an unemployed worker who previously held a permanent job
will search in the temporary market if his skill drops to a level below h∗.
1.5.6 Value of Worker
Let Wperm(h) denote the present value of a permanent worker. Let WNperm(h) de-
note the present value of a new permanent worker:
WNperm(h) = w
N
perm(h) + β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δperm)(WEperm(h′) − U(h′)) + U(h′)
]
, (1.6)
subject to the law of motion for h.
An existing permanent worker faces an exogenous probability of match de-
struction, δperm, at the beginning of each period. If the match is not destroyed,
then the worker stays at the same firm. The worker then provides labor and
receives wages. Let WEperm(h) denote the present value of an existing permanent
worker:
WEperm(h) = w
E
perm(h) + β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δperm)(WEperm(h′) − U(h′)) + U(h′)
]
, (1.7)
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subject to the law of motion for h. The only difference between the value of a
new worker and an existing worker is the wage.
Finally, let Wtemp(h) denote the present value of a temporary worker.
Wtemp(h, z) = wtemp(h) + β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δtemp)(Wtemp(h′) − U(h′)) + U(h′)
]
, (1.8)
subject to the law of motion for h.
1.5.7 Value of a Job
Let JNperm(h) denote the present value of a new permanent job
JNperm(h) =yperm − wNperm(h) (1.9)
+ β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δperm)(JEperm(h′) − V) + V − δpermφ
]
,
subject to the law of motion for h. The match continues to next period unless
it is not exogenous with the probability δperm. If the match is destroyed at the
beginning of next period, the firms pay the firing costs of φ.
Let JEperm(h) denote the present value of an existing permanent job
JEperm(h) =yperm − wEperm(h) (1.10)
+ β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δperm)(JEperm(h′) − V) + V − δpermφ
]
,
subject to the law of motion for h.
The value of an existing permanent job and the value of a new permanent
job differ only in their wages. As explained above, wages differ because new
permanent firms do not need to pay firing costs when they reject new workers.
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Similarly, let Jtemp(h) define the present value of a temporary job:
Jtemp(h) =ytemp − wtemp(h) (1.11)
+ β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δtemp)(Jtemp(h′) − V) + V
]
,
subject to the law of motion for h. The value of temporary jobs is similar to that
of permanent jobs except that temporary jobs do not incur firing costs.
1.5.8 Value of Vacancy and the Free Entry Condition
Finally, the value of posting a vacancy in the permanent market is
Vperm = −κperm + β(1 − ν)γX E
[
q(θperm)
∫
h
(JNperm(h) − Vperm)dµhperm + Vperm
]
, (1.12)
where µhperm is the skill distribution of unemployed workers in the permanent
market. I assume that at the time of posting vacancies, the firms do not know
the skill distribution of the job-seekers. The worker’s skill is revealed only after
he or she and the firm meet. Thus, the job-filling rate is the same across all skill-
levels. The cost of posting a vacancy is defined as κperm for permanent jobs. The
worker and firm meet at a job-filling probability given by q(θperm). If the vacancy
meets a worker, then a new job is formed whose continuation value is given by
JNperm(h, z).
The value of posting a vacancy in the temporary market is
Vtemp = −κtemp + β(1 − ν)γX E
[
q(θtemp)
∫
h
(Jtemp(h) − Vtemp)dµhtemp + Vtemp
]
, (1.13)
where µhtemp is the skill distribution of unemployed workers in the temporary
market and κtemp is the cost of posting a vacancy in the temporary market. Each
vacancy meets the job-seeker with the probability of q(θtemp). In equilibrium, the
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free-entry condition drives the value of a vacancy in both markets down to zero:
Vperm = 0 and Vtemp = 0.
1.5.9 Wage Determination
Following [60], I assume that workers and firms negotiate wages such that they
split the matching surplus according to the Nash Bargaining game. Following
[63] and [60], I assume that there is a two-tier wage structure for permanent
jobs. This assumption is motivated by the observation that newly employed
permanent firms do not have to pay firing costs if they reject workers before
the employment relationships begin. Once workers start working, firms have to
pay their firing costs if they are laid off. Let η denote a worker’s fixed bargaining
power. According to the Nash Bargaining solution, the new permanent worker
and the firm split the match surplus as follows:
(1 − η)(WNperm(h) − Uperm(h)) = ηJNperm(h) (1.14)
The existing permanent worker and a firm split the match surplus as follows:
(1 − η)(WEperm(h) − Uperm(h)) = η(JEperm(h) + φ) (1.15)
Finally, for the temporary worker and firm, the match surplus is divided as
follows:
(1 − η)(Wtemp(h) − Utemp(h)) = ηJtemp(h) (1.16)
27
Then, wages for new permanent workers can be shown as follows:18
wNperm = (1 − η)b + η
(
yperm − β(1 − ν)γX(1 − δperm)φ
)
(1.17)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(piperm − piu)U(h) + piuU(h − ∆h) − pipermU(h + ∆h)
}
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piu) f (θperm)(WNperm(h) − U(h))
+ piu f (θj)(WNj (h − ∆h) − U(h − ∆h))
}
The wage equation (1.17) looks complicated. However, the basic intuition of
the Nash Bargaining solution holds in this wage equation. The wage is the
weighted average of the workers’ outside options and firm profits. A worker’s
outside option is the unemployment income, b, plus the expected value of find-
ing another job if the worker becomes unemployed. Note that there is a possi-
bility that the workers’ skill will drop to a level below h∗ during the next period
that they become unemployed. If their skills drops to a level below h∗, they will
search in the temporary market. Thus, j in the last line of equation 1.17 could
be either “perm” or “temp,” depending on the workers’ skill level. Firms and
workers also take into consideration the value of being unemployed in the case
of a skill upgrade if the match does not dissolve and the value of being unem-
ployed in the case of a skill deterioration if the match is destroyed, both of which
is captured in the equation’s second line (1.17). Additionally, new workers are
willing to accept lower initial wage if they can start working at firms and be-
come existing workers during the next period. In this case, the workers can use
the firing costs as a credible threat against the firm to demand a higher wage.
18See Appendix A.4 for the derivation.
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For existing permanent workers, the wages are given by:
wEperm = (1 − η)b + η(yperm + (1 − ηβ(1 − ν)γX(1 − δperm))ηφ) (1.18)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(piperm − piu)U(h) + piuU(h − ∆h) − pipermU(h + ∆h)
}
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piu) f (θperm)(WNperm(h) − U(h))
+ piu f (θj)(WNj (h − ∆h) − U(h − ∆h))
}
Note that because existing permanent workers now know that their employers
have to pay firing costs if the matches dissolve, the workers can demand higher
wages. In our wage equation for the existing permanent worker, this appears
in the form of ηφ in the first line of equation (1.18), which gives the additional
wage premium for the existing permanent worker.
For temporary workers, the wages are as follows:
wtemp = (1 − η)b + η(ytemp) (1.19)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(pitemp − piu)U(h) + piuU(h − ∆h) − pitempU(h + ∆h)
}
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piu) f (θtemp)(WNtemp(h) − U(h))
+ piu f (θtemp)(WNtemp(h − ∆h) − U(h − ∆h))
}
Since no firing cost is incurred for temporary jobs, φ does not enter the wage
equation for temporary workers.
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1.5.10 Dynamics of Distribution
Finally, the unemployment rate for each skill-level evolves as follows:
u′(h) =(1 − piu)(1 − f (θ j)) · u(h) + piu(1 − f (θ j)) · u(h + ∆h) (1.20)
+ (1 − pij)δj · (1 − u(h)) + pijδj · (1 − u(h − ∆h)),
where j in equation 1.20 could be “perm” or “temp” depending on the skill
level, h.
1.6 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match data at the monthly frequency. Table 1.2 sum-
marizes the externally calibrated parameters.
Table 1.2: Externally calibrated parameters
Variable Description Value / Source
R Interest Rate 1.04651/12, interest rate before 1990
β Discount rate 1/R
δperm Separation rate for perm workers 0.0030, [53]
δperm Separation rate for temp workers 0.0061, [53]
γX Technological growth rate 1.0451/12, growth rate before 1990
θperm Labor market tightness in perm sector 1.0, normalization
θtemp Labor market tightness in temp sector 2.24, [53]
ψ Matching elasticity 0.6, [52]
η Nash bargaining power for workers 0.6, see text
ν Retirement probability 0.00208, see text
h min skill level 0
h max skill level 5
∆h Human capital increment 0.0336, 150 equispaced grid
σh std. of initial skill dist. 0.494, see text
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I set the interest rate R = 1.04651/12, which was the average real interest rate
between 1980 and 1990. For the discount factor, I simply take the inverse of R. I
set the steady state rate of technological growth, γX = 1.0451/12, which translates
into an average annual growth rate of 4.5%, which, in fact was the Japanese
average GDP growth rate between 1980 and 1990.
I assume that matching efficiency parameters, m¯ j are different across sectors
and that the elasticity parameters, ψ also are the same. [43] estimated that the
elasticity, ψ, for the Japanese labor market is 0.6. This value lies in the plausible
range of 0.5-0.7 that [59] report. I set η = 0.6 according to the Hosios condition.
For the benchmark calibration, I target the average monthly job finding rate
of 0.155 and the average monthly separation rate of 0.0035. These are the aver-
ages of corresponding data moments between 1980 and 1991 as reported by [52]
and [43]. Following [53], I calculate that the ratio of the separation rate for per-
manent workers to temporary workers is 0.49, as indicated in the Survey on Em-
ployment Trends conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. The
job separation rates for permanent workers and temporary workers are chosen
such that both the aggregate separation rate in the economy and the ratio of the
separation rates between the two types of workers are matched. The Report on
Employment Service conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
reports the job openings to application ratios of both permanent and temporary
workers, which reflect labor market tightness. Based on the data and the esti-
mates used by [53], I target the ratio of labor market tightness for temporary to
permanent θtemp/θperm = 2.24. I normalize θperm = 1. Each worker has an average
working life of 40 years, which implies ν = 0.00208. The maximum and min-
imum values of human capital h and h are chosen so that large masses of the
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skilled workers do not accumulate at the endpoints of the skill distribution. I
set ∆h = 0.0336, using a grid that has 150 equispaced points.
Workers in my model are born with an initial skill level. I assume that the
initial skill is drawn from a log-Normal distribution ∼ lnN(0, σ2h), and I estimate
σh by first running the following regression using the Japanese Household Panel
Survey:
log(monthly incomei,t) = α + Xi,tβ + ηi + i,t (1.21)
where Xi,t includes job-tenure (cubic function), work experience (cubic function),
employment type (permanent, temporary), and fixed effects for city-size, year,
and industry. Then, σh is the estimated permanent deviation of ηi in equation
1.21, which equals 0.494.
Table 1.4 lists the internally calibrated parameters. I estimate the follow-
ing parameters by a simulated method of moments: φ, b, m¯perm, m¯temp, A¯, piperm,
pitemp, and piu. These parameters are estimated so that the model-produced mo-
ments match the data moments below. There are as many parameters as there
are targeted moments. I begin by targeting the share of temporary workers to
be 8.0%, which was the average share of temporary workers for Japanese men
during the years 1985 to 1990. By focusing on the male population, I avoid the
effects that arise when there is greater female participation in the labor force.
Following [53], I calculate from the Survey on Employment Trends conducted
by Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare that the ratio of job-finding rate of
permanent workers to that of temporary workers is 0.45 . I also target the wage
distribution of the p90/p50 ratio to be 1.88, which, as estimated by [45], were the
average Japanese p90/p50 ratios prior to 1990. Using the estimated difference in
return to working at the same firm between permanent workers and temporary
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workers provided in Section 1.3.1, I target the average difference in return on
working between the two types of jobs to be 0.622%.19 Finally, estimating from
the KHPS and the JHPS datasets, I target the average wage ratio between per-
manent workers and temporary workers to be 1.681. The list of data moments
is displayed in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Targeted moments
Moment Data (Target)
Model
Output
Job finding rate 0.155 0.1520
Ratio of job finding rate: perm/temp 0.450 0.4496
Job separation rate 0.0035 0.0039
Unemployment income 0.5796(40% of average wage) 0.5691
Share of temporary workers 0.080 0.0812
Wage distribution, p90/p50 1.880 1.7942
Average return on job tenure for perm workers 0.622% 0.628%
Average wage ratio: perm/temp 1.6808 1.7454
Table 1.4: Internally calibrated parameters
Variable Description Value
φ Firing cost 9.3714
b Unemployment income 0.5691
m¯perm Matching efficiency in permanent sector 0.1417
m¯temp Matching efficiency in temporary sector 0.2282
A Productivity of temporary worker 0.8535
piperm Probability of skill upgrade for perm sector 0.0204
pitemp Probability of skill upgrade for temp sector 0.0150
piu Probability of skill deterioration for unemployed 0.0184
19The common wage growth component observed in Section 1.3.1 is captured in γX . The only
margin that matters in my model is the difference between the rate of wage growth between
permanent workers and temporary workers.
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The estimated values of the parameters are shown in Table 1.4. Since the
average wage of a permanent worker in my model is 1.4787, the firing cost is
estimated to be approximately equal to six months of wage compensation.20 Fol-
lowing [26] and [53], I target the unemployment income to be about 40% of the
average monthly wage of all workers, which is 0.5796. The estimated value of b
is 0.5691. The estimated value of the matching efficiency in the permanent mar-
ket and the temporary market implies that job finding rates in these sectors are
0.1417 and 0.3151, respectively. These numbers are targeted so that the job find-
ing rate for the overall economy also matches the average monthly job-finding
rate in Japan prior to 1990, which was approximately 0.155. The productivity of
temporary workers is estimated to be 0.8535. Each month, the probabilities of
skill upgrades for permanent jobs and temporary jobs are estimated to be 2.04%
and 1.50%, respectively. If workers are unemployed, each month their skills
deteriorate with the probability of 1.84%.
1.7 Results
To determine how slow growth affects the dual labor market, I now set the
annual rate of technological growth to 1%. This is roughly equivalent to the
Japanese’s experience of economic growth during the lost decade(s). For the
benchmark result, I also decrease the market interest rate so that it equals the
average real interest in Japan between 1996 and 2014. Decreasing the real inter-
est rate in my model is important because as the interest rate goes down, the
20[42] estimated that in France the termination of the contract of a permanent job is 16% of the
annual wage for an individual layoff and 50% of the annual wage for a collective layoff. Given
that about four out of six layoffs are individual layoffs, the average cost is 20% of the annual
wage. [9] found that firing costs in Spain are about 20% higher than in France. [5] estimated the
firing cost are 51% of annual wages.
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future incomes are discounted at a lower rate, which reduces the effect of slow
growth on the labor market. I fully take this into account when I conduct the
experiment by decreasing the real interest rate to a level that we observe in the
data. Table 1.5 summarizes the quantitative result.
Table 1.5: Moments comparison under two regimes
(1) (2)
Technological growth rate γX = 1.041/12 γX = 1.011/12
Job finding rate 0.1520 0.1543
Job separation rate 0.0032 0.0035
Share of temporary worker 0.0812 0.1623
Average wage ratio: perm/temporary 1.7454 1.8282
Unemployment rate 3.39% 3.49%
Annual rate of interest 1.040 1.0279
Market tightness in perm. sector 1.000 0.8713
Market tightness in temp. sector 2.240 1.9703
Job-finding rate in perm. sector 0.1417 0.1341
Job-finding rate in temp. sector 0.3151 0.2994
In Table 1.5, column (1) presents the model moments when the rate of tech-
nological progress is 4% annually; and column (2) displays the model moments
when the annual rate of technological progress is 1%. The share of temporary
workers almost doubled from 8.12% to 16.23%. The average share of temporary
workers for men in Japan increased from 8.0% between 1985 and 1990 to 20.62%
between 2010 and 2015. The model attributes as much as 64.3% of this increase
to slow growth.
Figure 1.4a demonstrates the choices that unemployed workers face when
deciding in which market to search for jobs. Figure 1.4a plots the values of un-
employment for workers who have different skills for the 4% growth steady
state and for the 1% growth steady state. The black line with triangles indicates
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the value of unemployment when the annual rate of economic growth is 4%.
The red line that is extending from the point, h∗0, shows the original cutoff level
or skill. The unemployed workers whose skill level is below h∗0 optimally search
for temporary jobs, whereas the unemployed workers whose skill level is above
h∗0 search in the permanent market. The value of unemployment is flat when
workers are searching for temporary jobs because regardless of the workers’
ability, they face the same job-finding probability and use the same production
technology once they are employed. In contrast, the value of unemployment in-
creases with skill level when workers are searching for permanent jobs because
they can fully utilize their skills at the time of production. The black solid line
indicates the value of unemployment in the 1% growth steady state. As the rate
of economic growth slows down, the value of unemployment goes down. In
this steady state, the cutoff level, h∗1, shifts to the right, which induces a larger
fraction of workers to search in the temporary market. The cutoff level moves
to the right because the decrease in the value of unemployment in the perma-
nent market is more significant than the decrease of the value of unemployment
in the temporary market. The reduction is larger for the permanent market
because the present value of wage growth decreases as all future incomes are
discounted at a higher rate. Considering this, the unemployed workers whose
skill level is within the range of (h∗0, h
∗
1) will switch from searching for jobs in
the permanent market to searching for jobs in the temporary market. Thus, the
share of temporary workers in the economy increases.
The market tightness in both sectors decreased, which indicates that firms
post fewer vacancies per job-seeker when the economy is in the slow growth
steady state. The decrease in market tightness leads to a low job-finding rate.
The job-finding rates in the permanent and temporary market decreased by
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Figure 1.4: Baseline Calibration
(a) Value of Unemployment (b) Skill distribution by employment types
5.36% and by 4.98%, respectively. Reinforcing the points made in the previous
paragraph, Figure 1.4b clearly demonstrates that in the slower growth stead-
state, the left tail of the skill distribution for workers in the permanent market
shifted to the right. As the average skill levels of the permanent labor market
increases, the model also predicts that the wage ratio between permanent and
temporary employment increases in the slow growth steady-state.
In reality, most permanent employment relationships begin during a period
when workers, who are in their 20s or early 30s, have lower skills. Consistent
with the model’s prediction, Figure 1.2b shows that the most significant increase
in the share of temporary workers was experienced by 25-34 year-old males: in
this population the share of temporary workers increased from an average of
3.41% between 1988 and 1992 to an average of 15.56% between 2010 and 2014.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, for the economy as a whole, the job-finding
rate in the slower growth steady state increased slightly to 0.1543; in the faster
growth steady-state it was 0.1520. The job-finding rate increased because of
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the large increase in the share of temporary workers in the economy. The job-
finding rate is higher for temporary employment, and, thus, increasing the share
of temporary workers improves the matching efficiency for the labor market
overall. Likewise, the separation rate increases for the economy as a whole
because a larger fraction of workers are now employed in the temporary jobs
whose the job separation rate is higher.
Finally, the unemployment rate of the aggregate economy will increase in
the slow growth steady state. This is consistent with the Japanese experience,
wherein the unemployment rate has increased significantly during the last two
decades. In this model, unemployment goes down because a greater number of
workers search in a temporary market whose matching efficiency is higher.
1.7.1 No Endogenous Skill Accumulation
To highlight the importance of endogenous skill accumulation in my model, I
again lower the steady state growth rate in an economy from 4% to 1%, but I
impose zero human capital accumulation (i.e. piperm = pitemp = piu = 0). In this
environment workers are born with randomly realized skills, and these skills
do not change for the rest of their careers. I re-calibrate the model to match the
moments listed in Appendix A.5.
Table 1.6 summarizes the results of this experiment. The most striking result
is that the share of temporary workers does not increase at all. Figure 1.5b shows
that the change in the shape of the workers’ skill distribution is very limited
even after the steady-state growth rate has decreased to 1%. When human skills
are not allowed to evolve, the rate of decrease in the value of searching in the
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Table 1.6: No Human Capital Accumulation
Moments comparison under two regimes
(1) (2)
Technological growth rate γX = 1.041/12 γX = 1.011/12
Job finding rate 0.1585 0.1580
Ratio of job finding rate: perm/temporary 0.4496 0.4493
Job separation rate 0.0033 0.0033
Share of temporary worker 0.0937 0.0937
Unemployment rate 3.28% 3.29%
Annual rate of interest 1.040 1.0279
Job-finding rate in permanent sector 0.1461 0.1456
Job-finding rate in temporary sector 0.3249 0.3240
permanent and of searching in the temporary sectors is symmetrical. As Figure
1.5a reveals, although the value of unemployment in the 4% growth steady state
(black line with triangular) decreases when the economic growth becomes 1%
(black solid line), the value of unemployment in the permanent market and the
value of unemployment in the temporary market both go down by the same
margin, which leaves the cutoff level h∗ unaltered. In this case, workers will
continue to compare the value of searching in the permanent market against the
value of searching in the temporary market in the manner they did before the
change occurred.
In this environment, the job-finding rate, the job separation rate, and the un-
employment rate are not affected by the slowdown of economic growth as well.
This section confirms that on-the-job training plays a key role in relationship
between slow growth and labor market composition. The only source of wage
growth in this model is skill accumulation. Thus, the steeper the rate of wage
growth for permanent workers, the larger the impact on labor market composi-
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Figure 1.5: No Human Capital Accumulation
(a) Value of Unemployment (b) Skill distribution by employment types
tion of changes in the growth rate.
1.7.2 Policy Experiment: Layoff Protection
Research indicates that strong protection against laying off permanent workers
induces firms to hire more temporary workers than permanent workers.21 The
underlying intuition is that layoff protection increases the burden placed on em-
ployers when they hire permanent workers. In this section, I discuss whether
the intuition holds in my model. Recently the Japanese government started a
discussion about whether it should create clearer rules for laying off workers,
including laws that require firms to pay lump-sum transfers to workers who
are being fired. Such policies are said to produce effects that resemble those
produced by the lenient layoff protection policy. Underlying the discussion is a
question: do firms, which are inherently risk-averse, hesitate to lay off workers
because the current layoff protection policies are vague? Many argue that loos-
21See [17].
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ening layoff protection laws should promote a more invigorated flow within the
labor market, which would help to alleviate occupational mismatches. I inves-
tigate this issue within my model’s framework.
In this model, the parameter, φ, controls the difficulty of firing a permanent
worker. Note that in my model φ is a pure waste that is not transferred to un-
employed workers. In the experiment presented below, I compute the model
statistics using different values of φ. Other parameter values are set according
to the baseline calibration presented in Section 1.7. Throughout the experiment
the steady-state annual growth rate is set to equal 1% and the annual real in-
terest rate equals 2.79%. Note that in our baseline calibration, the estimated
value of φ, 9.3714 is approximately equal to six months of the average wages of
permanent workers. Table 1.7 summarizes the results of the model statistics.
Table 1.7: Model statistics with different layoff policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
φ = 0 φ = 9.37/2 φ = 9.37 φ = 9.37 × 2 φ = 9.37 × 4
in terms of monthly wages 0 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months
Job finding rate 0.1536 0.1518 0.1543 0.1551 0.1522
Ratio of job finding rate: perm/temp 0.4550 0.4550 0.4496 0.4372 0.4170
Job separation rate 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 0.0036 0.0036
Share of temporary worker 0.1398 0.1398 0.1623 0.1860 0.2110
Average wage ratio perm/temp 1.7938 1.8004 1.8282 1.8638 1.9135
Unemployment rate 3.46% 3.50% 3.49% 3.52% 3.63%
Job-finding rate in perm. sector 0.1364 0.1347 0.1341 0.1317 0.1255
Job-finding rate in temp. sector 0.2968 0.2960 0.2994 0.3013 0.3011
Cutoff level, h∗ 0.6711 0.6711 0.7047 0.7383 0.7718
Each column in Table 1.7 shows the model statistics; corresponding values of
φ are at the top of the table. I first compare the results from column (1) and col-
umn (2) against the baseline result in column (3) where φ is approximately equal
to 6 months of wages. Column (1) shows that when φ = 0, the share of tempo-
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rary workers is 13.98%. Compare this to 16.23%, which is the share of temporary
workers in the baseline calibration in column (3). The share of temporary work-
ers decreases because in this economy the job-finding rate for permanent jobs is
high, which increases the value of searching jobs in the permanent market and
induces more people to search permanent jobs. Accordingly, the cutoff level,
h∗ also decreases to 0.6711 (column (1)) from 0.7047 (column (3)) of the baseline
calibration, which indicates that unemployed workers with a skill level between
0.6711 and 0.7047 find it optimal to search for temporary jobs rather than per-
manent jobs. The job-finding rate for permanent jobs is elevated because firms
are posting more vacancies in the permanent market. Since the present value of
permanent jobs increases as the firing cost goes down, firms will compete with
each other to post more vacancies until the value of posting vacancies becomes
zero. The separation rate for the overall economy also decreases because there
is a decreased share of temporary workers, and so the unemployment rate goes
down.
Columns (4) and (5) report model statistics when φ’s are equal to as much
as 12 months and 24 months, respectively, of average monthly wages. When φ
equals 24 months of average monthly wages, the share of temporary workers
goes up to a strikingly high level of 21.10% that is strikingly high compared to
the baseline case of 16.23%. This is caused by the significant reduction in the
job-finding rate in the permanent market, which is caused by the fact that firms
now post fewer permanent market vacancies. As φ increases, the number of va-
cancy posting firms and the job-finding rate for permanent jobs decrease, which
causes the value of searching in the permanent market to drop, too. Thus, the
cutoff skill level when φ equals 12 months and 24 months of monthly wages in-
creases to 0.7383 and 0.7718, respectively, which encourages workers who have
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skills below these new cutoff levels to search for jobs in the temporary market
instead of the permanent market. In these economies, the job-finding rate in
the permanent market is so low that workers who previously has searched in
the permanent market now find it optimal to search in the temporary market.
Finally, the job separation rate for overall economy goes up because the share
of temporary workers increases, which results in unemployment rates that are
higher than those found in the baseline model.
In summary, reducing firing cost decreases unemployment and the share of
temporary workers. This conclusion is consistent with [17]’s finding that in-
creasing the firing cost induces firms to substitute permanent workers for tem-
porary workers. Loosening of layoff protection removes the burden placed on
firms of hiring permanent workers and increases the value of permanent jobs,
which motivate firms to post more vacancies in the permanent market. Thus,
more job-seeker are attracted to the permanent market, and the share of tempo-
rary workers decreases.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates how the rate of economic growth affects the composition
of the labor market. I build a search and matching model of a dual labor market
that is inhabited by heterogeneous workers. I find that the rate of workers’ skill
accumulation on-the-job significantly affects the manner in which slow growth
impacts labor market composition. Specifically, the higher the rate of skill ac-
cumulation for permanent workers, the greater the impact of slow growth on
labor market composition. My model attributes as much as 64.3% of the ob-
43
served increase in the share of Japan’s temporary workers to that country’s slow
growth. Finally, I conduct policy experiments to determine how lay-off regula-
tions change labor market conditions. When a faster rate of skill accumulation
is combined with slower economic growth, the labor market condition can dra-
matically change.
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CHAPTER 2
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS USING RADIAL BASIS FUNCTIONS: WITH
APPLICATION TO THE US ECONOMY
2.1 Introduction
Understanding time series properties of macroeconomic variables has been a
major focus of macroeconomic research. In this paper, I propose a neural-
network based time series estimator using a learning network. In particular,
I focus on a class of network called the Radial Basis Function (RBF). The neural-
network time series approach is motivated by the limitation that the standard
approach faces in identifying the dynamic effect of shocks because it relies on
structural Vector-Autoregressions (VARs), which are linear. While VARs can be
useful in answering macroeconomic questions that pertain to linear relation-
ships between macroeconomic variables, questions such as the asymmetric ef-
fects of fiscal and monetary shocks cannot be answered within a VAR frame-
work. In contrast, the network-based models have the following two advan-
tages that mitigate the limitation that the parametric models face. First, network
models are robust when encountering functional-form errors since they do not
rely on restrictive parametric assumptions. Second, they are adaptive and re-
spond to structural changes in the underlying data-generating process in ways
that linear estimators cannot. With these two advantages, the neural-network
base models are capable of answering questions about potential asymmetries
in the economic structure without increasing the number of parameters to be
estimated. In fact, the great degree of flexibility that the neural-network models
permit is particularly attractive when researchers have little knowledge about
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the true functional form of the data-generating process. For example, after the
recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve set the federal fund rate to essentially
zero and has kept it at the same level for more than 7 years. Many argued that
the behavior of the economy is both quantitatively and qualitatively different
when the interest rates is at the zero lower bound (ZLB). The flexibility that
the network formulas can provide is beneficial in this context because it allows
us to analyze the structure of the economy without relying on any restrictive
parametric assumptions about the structure of the economy.
To validate the performance of our approach using a small sample size, I
conduct a number of Monte-Carlo simulations, using a nonlinear New Keyne-
sian model. Nonlinearity in this NK model comes from a kink in the central
bank’s monetary policy rule where the interest rates is restricted to be always
positive. Using the simulated data, I compare the out-of-sample prediction er-
ror performance of the RBF estimator with the prediction error of traditional
estimators, i.e., Vector-Autoregressions (VARs) and Bayesian VARs (BVARs). I
find that the RBF estimator does equally as well as the VAR models and that the
RBF estimator outperforms the BVAR models. Next, I conducted the impulse
response analysis using the RBF estimator and compared the results with the
impulse responses of the linear VARs. The gist of this exercise is testing if the
RBF estimator can ‘uncover’ the structure of the nonlinear NK model without
imposing any parametric assumptions. I found that the RBF time series analy-
sis can successfully capture the quantitative difference in the responses of key
macroeconomic variables between normal and ZLB periods in a manner that a
linear VAR cannot. Even when the sample size is limited to as small as 300 pe-
riods (quarters), the impulse reposes of the RBF time series are able to capture
the qualitative difference in how macroeconomic variables react to a shock to
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the discount factor between normal and ZLB periods.
I then applied the RBF estimator to the US quarterly data from 1955 to 2013.
I found that the RBF estimator slightly underperforms in terms of 1 quarter- and
2 quarter-ahead predictions when it is compared with the VAR and BVAR mod-
els. However, the RBF estimator performs equally as well as the VAR and BVAR
when it predicts 4, 8, and 12 quarters ahead. Finally, using the (utilization-
adjusted) TFP, I examined the impulse responses of key macroeconomic vari-
ables in response to a positive TFP shock. I found that the RBF estimator can
produce impulse responses that are different from the ones that are produced
by conventional VAR models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.3 reviews the related
literature, including literature on the Radial Basis Function in Section 2.2. Sec-
tion 2.4 describes the Monte Carlo simulation exercise, Section 2.5 illustrates
empirical application of the RBF method to the U.S. data, and Section 2.6 con-
cludes.
2.2 Radial Basis Function
In this paper, I focus on a particular class of learning network, which is the
Radial Basis Functions. RBFs were first introduced as a solution technique for
interpolation problems, and in the late 1980s, the RBF formulation was extended
to perform more general task of approximation 1. Consider some unknown
function y = f (x), which is to be approximated given a sparse dataset (xt, yt). In
terms of multiple-regression analogy of the RBFs, the d-dimensional vector, xt,
1see [14], [54], and [62]
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may be considered the independent variables, while yt the dependent variable.
f (·) is the nonlinear function or the conditional expectation of yt given xt, hence:
yt = f (xt) + t, E[t|xt] = 0 (2.1)
In the case of the Radial Basis Functions, f (xt) can be written as follows:
f (xt) =
M∑
j=1
Kλ j(ξ j, xt)β j (2.2)
=
M∑
j=1
D
( ||xt − ξ j||
λ j
)
β j (2.3)
where each basis element is indexed by a location parameter or centroid, ξ j,
and a scale parameter λ j. M is the number of centroids in the model. I choose
the Gaussian density function for the kernel, D, since it is the most popular
choice of the base for the RBFs. Roughly speaking, when a new input enters the
system, the RBFs computes the Euclidean distance between the input and each
of the centroids, ξ j, for all j. Based on the distance measured, the RBFs compute
the predicted value, ŷt. I estimate the location parameters, ξ j, scale parameters,
λ j, and the β’s, to approximate the yt by solving the following minimization
problem:
min
{λ j,ξ j,β j}M1
T∑
t=1
yt − β0 − M∑
j=1
β j exp
− (xt − ξ j)′(xt − ξ j)λ2j


2
(2.4)
Again, the RBF can be intuitively described as a real-valued function whose
values depend only on the Euclidean distance between centroids and the inputs,
weighted by scale parameters λ j. The graphical description of the RBF is in
Figure 2.1.
Finally, our RBF time series model is augmented with lags, denoted by p,
which can now be written as follows:
yt =
M∑
j=1
Kλ j
(
ξ j, {yt−h}ph=1
)
β j + t (2.5)
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Figure 2.1: Graphical description of RBF
where t, a vector of error terms.
2.2.1 Property of Radial Basis Functions
Although application of RBFs in economics is a relatively new development,
some properties of this class of artificial neural networks have been studied in
the last two decades in the field of computer science. First property of the RBF
is its universal approximation property, which was introduced by [58], [73], and
[28]. The main conclusion of these authors is that any continuous function on a
compact domain can be approximated arbitrarily well by the RBFs.
Naturally, the next step of the universal approximation property is to con-
sider how fast the approximation converges to the original function. To an-
swer this question, [27] derived bounds on convergence of the RBFs given some
assumptions about the smoothness of the functions being approximated. [56]
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extended this result for the estimation problem and derived a bound on the
“generalization error” of the RBFs, the error that an RBF network will make on
unseen data. Their result is summarized in Figure 2.2. First, it is apparent that
the generalization error is a decreasing function of the number of data points,
N. Second, Figure 2.2 also shows that, given a number of data points, the error
is, at first, a decreasing function of the number of network parameters, n, and
after n exceed some threshold point, the error becomes an increasing function of
n. Therefore, Figure 2.2 suggests that given a number of data points, there is a
optimal number of parameter in the network formula that minimizes the gener-
alization error. I will use the information criteria (IC) to determine the number
of parameters in the RBFs.
Figure 2.2: Generalization error E(n,N) for a Gaussian RBF as a function of num-
ber of data points N and the number of network parameters n (Reprinted from
[56]).
[56] also found that the generalization error of unseen data depends on the
number of observation and on the complexity of the network being approxi-
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mated.
2.2.2 Parameter Estimation Methods
As specified in Section 2.2.1, there are three types of parameters that need to
be estimated: centroids ξ j, scale parameters λ j, and β j. In the neural network
literature, estimating such parameters is called “training.” Rate of convergence
for RBFs is different depending on which training method is being used. This
paper is not intended to answer which training method is optimal. Therefore,
I employ one of the popular methods of training, which adopt the following
procedure. First, I use a clustering method to fix the value of centroids, ξ j. Some
argue that the global solution method is ideal when estimating the centroids
to minimize the equation (2.4), but such a method exponentially increases the
computational costs. Rather, a common practice is using a K-clustering method
to determine the value of centroids. In this paper, I use a clustering method
proposed by [50] because it is shown to be pick data points that best represents
the entire sample.
After I estimate the centroids, I then use global optimization algorithm
(”interior-region” algorithm) to determine the scale parameters, λ j. One con-
venient property of the RBFs is that after ξ j and λ j are pinned down, β j can
be estimated in a usual OLS manner, which greatly reduces the computational
costs. Thus, I estimate the values of λ j and β j simultaneously in such a way
that it will minimize the error specified in equation (2.4). Finally, I restrict num-
ber of parameters to be estimated such that it does not exceed the number of
parameter used in the VAR model.
51
2.3 Literature Review
This paper is obviously related to the literature on nonlinear time series analysis.
As described by [8], the literature can be mainly classified into two.
The first approach to capture nonlinearities relies on the use of regime-
switching VAR models including threshold VARs (e.g., [33]) and Markov-
switching VARs ([30]). One caveat of this approach is that, while regime-
switching VARs can capture state dependence of macroeconomic variables, the
relationships captured in each state have to be linear. Thus, they cannot capture
asymmetric effects of a shock where the impulse response to a shock can depend
on the sign of that shock. Furthermore, the regime-switching VAR models as-
sume that the economy is in a finite number of regimes where the economy can
be approximated with linear relationships in each of these regimes. Obviously, if
the true data generating process features asymmetric impulse responses, a new
set of VAR coefficients are necessary each period. As a result, threshold VARs or
Markov-switching models typically require a large number of state variables to
capture such asymmetric data generating process. In contrast, the RBF estima-
tor can capture the possibly nonlinear and asymmetric structure of the economy
without increasing the number of parameters to be estimated because it does not
assume that the economy consists of different regimes. Rather it approximates
the possibly asymmetric economy as a whole using a small number of flexible
base functions.
The second approach captures nonlinear economic structure by estimating
the VAR models using contemporaneous and lagged values of independent
variables successively each period of interest. This strand of approach is pi-
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oneered by [39] who proposed the “Local Projection method”. While Jorda’s
method can easily capture nonlinearities in the response functions, the Local
Projection method poses serious difficulty when its efficiency is considered as
pointed as by [8]. Indeed, drawing inferences on a rich set of nonlinearities in-
cluding sign- and state-dependence using the Local Projection method is often
difficult due to its extensive efficiency cost. In contrast, the RBF approach di-
rectly approximates the potentially nonlinear data generating process using the
neural network based functions that are flexible. Since this approach does not
require the estimation of the VARs each period successively, its computational
burden does not increase exponentially with the complexity of the data gener-
ating functions.
Third and a relatively new approach is proposed by [8] who uses few num-
bers of Gaussian functions to approximate the impulse functions. Like [39], this
approach is robust to functional-form assumtion error but has a great advantage
of reduced efficiency costs. The current paper is similar to [8]’s in that both pa-
pers utilize the Gaussian functions to approximate macroeconomic structures.
The difference lies in that my approach uses the Gaussian functions as a VAR
representation as opposed to [8] who use the Gaussian functions in a moving-
average (MA) representation.
Finally, this paper is most closely related to [37] who applied the learning
networks including the RBFs to financial data and show that network formulas
can uncover the structure of the Black-Scholes pricing formula by conduting a
Monte Carlo simulations. They conclude that if the structure of data generating
process is unknown, the learning networks have high predicting power and can
outperform the parametric estimators in terms of out-of-sample prediction. Not
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surprisingly, the authors report that if the structure of data-generating process
is already known to a researcher, the parametric estimators, which assume (cor-
rectly) that the data are generated by the Black-Scholes pricing formulas, are
always more efficient than the learning networks. The current paper follows
[37]’s approach in that I first validate the use of the RBF estimator in the context
of macroeconomic time series analysis by conducting a number of Monte Carlo
simulation.
2.4 Monte Carlo simulation
To study the large and small sample behavior of the RBFs, I perform Monte
Carlo simulation in this section. The challenge I pose in this section is the fol-
lowing: if the structure of the economy was truly determined by a medium-
sized nonlinear New Keynesian (NK) model, can the RBF networks capture the
structure of NK model? Therefore, I first solve a stylized NK model nonlineary,
and simulate data using this NK model to perform Monte Carlo simulation. In
the Monte Carlo simulation exercise, I compare the out-of-sample prediction
performance of the RBF estimator with the VAR and BVAR models. Subsequent
subsections describe the NK model used for the simulation.
2.4.1 Model
The economy is inhabited by four types of agents: Households, Final good pro-
ducer, Intermediate goods producers, and Monetary authority. Except for the
habit persistence in the household sector, the following NK economy is stan-
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dard.
Households with Habit Persistence
There is a continuum of households who consume a composite good, Ct, supply
labour, Nt, and purchase bond Bt. The representative household maximizes the
expected lifetime utility given by:
Et
 ∞∑
t=1
δt−1
{
(Ct − γCt−1)1−σ
1 − σ +
(1 − Nt)1−κ
1 − κ
} (2.6)
where δt = βtbt is a discounting factor, which is subject to an exogenous pref-
erence shock bt. The shock process for the discounting factor is given by the
following:
log(bt) = ρb log(bt−1) + bt , 
b
t v N(0, σ
2
b) (2.7)
The household is also subject to the following budget constraint each period:
PtCt +
1
Rt
Bt = WtNt + Bt−1 + PtΠt (2.8)
where Pt,Wt, and Rt are commodity good price, nominal wage, and nominal
interest rates, respectively. In addition, Πt is the profit from the intermediate-
good firms.
We can maximize utility subject to the budget constraint to obtain the opti-
mal allocation of consumption across time,
λt = (Ct − γCt−1)−σ
and
λt = βbtEt[λt+1Rt/pit+1]
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where pit+1 = Pt+1/Pt.
The first order condition concerning labor supply decision is given by
Wt = ((1 − Nt)−κ/λt)
Final Good Producer
There are perfectly competitive final good producers who use intermediate
goods, Yt(i), for i ∈ [0, 1] as inputs and produce final good, Yt, at a price Pt to
maximize the profit given by:
max
Yt(i)
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di (2.9)
The technology of the final good producer is given by the following CES aggre-
gator:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
(η−1)
η di
) η
(η−1)
(2.10)
where Yt(i) and Pt(i) are quantity and price of an intermediate good i, respec-
tively.
Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods pro-
ducers who uses labor, Nt(i), as an input and solve the following cost minimiza-
tion problem:
min
Nt(i)
TC(Yt(i)) = WtNt(i) (2.11)
where TC is nominal total cost. The production technology of the intermediate
goods producers are given by the following:
Yt(i) = atNt(i) (2.12)
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where at is the exogenous productivity shock, whose process is given by:
log(at) = ρa log(at−1) + at , 
a
t v N(0, σ
2
a)
The cost minimization problem of firm i implies
mct =
Wt
Ptat
where mct is the Lagrange multiplier and also the real marginal cost of produc-
tion.
The intermediate goods producers are also subject to Calvo-type price set-
ting friction. In this environment, only a 1 − ξ fraction of the firms set prices
optimally each period: Pt(i) = P∗t . Thus, the fraction ξ of the firms are not al-
lowed to change the price, Pt(i) = Pt−1(i). The profit maximization problem of a
re-optimizing firm i is given by the following:
P∗t
∞∑
j=0
β jξ jEt
{
Λt+ j
[
P∗t Yt+ j(i) − Pt+ jmct+ jYt+ j(i)
]}
(2.13)
where Λt is the household’s marginal utility of wealth at period t. The inter-
mediate good producers are owned by the household. Thus, all the profits are
transferred to the households. The intermediate goods producers solve the op-
timization described above subject to the demand curve for their own goods
given by the following:
Yt(i) = Yt
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
(2.14)
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Monetary Authority
There is also a monetary authority in this economy who sets nominal interest
rate according to the Taylor rule given by the following:
Rt = max
 p¯iβ
(
Rt−1
p¯i/β
)φR ((pit
p¯i
)φpi (Yt
Y¯
)φy)1−φR
, 1
 (2.15)
where p¯i is inflation target, pit is inflation rate between t − 1 and t, and Y¯ is the
output target. Notice that this monetary authority is subject to the zero lower
bound, which means that the monetary authority cannot set nominal interest
rate below one.
Aggregate conditions
The aggregate resource constraint is simply given by
Ct = Yt
In the Calvo pricing setting, firms that change prices in different periods will
have different prices. Therefore, the economy needs to track price dispersion.
When firms have different relative prices, there are distortions that create a
wedge between the aggregate output measured in terms of production factor
inputs and aggregate demand measured in terms of composite goods. Specifi-
cally,
Nt(i) = Yt(i)/at =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η Yt
at
which implies,
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di =
Yt
at
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
di =
Ytvt
at
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where price dispersion, vt, can be described as:
vt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
= ξpi
η
t vt−1 + (1 − ξ)
(
P∗t
Pt
)−η
2.4.2 Equilibrium conditions
I summarize below the first order conditions that characterize the equilibrium
of our economy. Let p∗t = P∗t /Pt. Then:
λt =(Ct − γCt−1)−σ (2.16)
λt =βbtEt[λt+1Rt/(pit+1)] (2.17)
vtYt =atNt (2.18)
mct =((1 − Nt)−κ/λt)/at (2.19)
Ct =Yt (2.20)
Rt =max
 p¯iβ
(
Rt−1
p¯i/β
)φR ((pit
p¯i
)φpi (Yt
Y¯
)φy)1−φR
, 1
 (2.21)
p∗t =((1 − ξpiη−1)/(1 − ξ))1/(1−η) (2.22)
vt =ξpi
η
t vt−1 + (1 − ξ)p∗t −η (2.23)
S t =λtmctYt + βξEt[pi
η
t+1S t+1] (2.24)
Ft =λtYt + βξEt[pi
η−1
t+1 Ft+1] (2.25)
p∗t =S t/Ft (2.26)
2.4.3 Numerical Solution and Simulated Data
The zero lower bound in the Taylor rule introduces a nonlinearity in the NK
model. Thus, the solution to the equilibrium condition must be obtained using
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global numerical methods. In this subsection, I briefly describe the main steps
of the algorithm.2 Let S = [vt,Ct−1,Rt−1, at, bt] be the state variables of the model.
I use a projection method combined with a clustering method introduced by
[50]. Specifically, there are three future variables, [pit+1(S ),Yt+1(S ), Ft+1(S )], that
need to be interpolated. I approximate each of future variables with the RBFs,
[pit+1(S˜ ),Yt+1(S˜ ), Ft+1(S˜ )], in such a way that equilibrium conditions of the model,
detailed in Section 2.4.2, are satisfied at a set of collocation points, S˜ . The col-
location points, S˜ , are selected based on the [50] clustering methods. By using
a sparse grid, the curse of dimensionality is greatly reduced when solving the
model globally.
Using this nonlinear NK model, I simulated time series data for 100,000 pe-
riods. Out of 100,000 periods, the nominal interest rate hits 1093 times.
2.4.4 Generalized Impulse Response
In this section, I examine if the impulse responses estimated by the RBF methods
can trace the true structural impulse responses of the nonlinear NK model that
is specified and solved above. For the purpose of a clear identification, I assume
that the only source of variation in the economy is the discount factor shock. I
will give a positive shock (one standard deviation) to the discount factor. Im-
pulse responses are estimated in (1) normal state and (2) zero lower bound (zlb)
state.
For estimation, I pretend that I observe all state variables: Xt =
2See Appendix B.2 and B.3 for the details of the implementation and a discussion of its accu-
racy.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses
training periods = 10,000
(a) Consumption (b) Nominal Interest Rate
[vt+1 Ct Rt bt+1].
Xt = RBF(
P∑
p=1
Xt−p) + t
Figure 2.3 shows the results of impulse responses when the length of training
set is 10,000. The blue and red solid lines in Figure 2.3 indicate the true impulse
responses of the nonlinear NK model in a normal state and a zlb state, respec-
tively. The blue and red dotted lines are the estimated impulse responses of the
RBF estimator in the normal and zlb state, respectively. Finally, the dotted black
line is the estimated impulse response of a linear VAR. The RBF method cor-
rectly captures the difference in the true impulse responses between the normal
state and zlb state. Not surprisingly, the impulse responses of a linear VAR only
traces the impulse response in the normal state and completely ignores the dif-
ferential responses of consumption and interest rates in the zlb state. Moreover,
the impulse responses by the linear VAR are almost identical to the impulse
response of the RBF estimator in the normal state.
In reality, an applied macroeconomist does not have access data that are as
large as 10,000. Thus, in the next step, I conducted the same experiment when
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses
training periods = 300
(a) Consumption (b) Nominal Interest Rate
the length of training set is equal to 300. The results are shown in Figure 2.4.
The figure highlights that the estimated impulse responses of consumption us-
ing the RBF estimator successfully capture both the qualitative and quantitative
difference in the responses of consumption between the normal state and zlb
state. Again, this is in contrast with the impulse responses of the VAR model
where it can only produce the impulse response of consumption that appears
to resemble the true response of consumption in the normal state. However,
the estimated responses of the interest rates using the RBF estimator underes-
timates the true impulse response in the zlb state and overestimates the true
response in the normal state. The likely reason for failing to capture the magni-
tude of responses is that the length of the training set in this experiment (300) is
not sufficient to trace the sharp kink of the zero lower bound. For the purpose
of comparison, the VAR model also suffers from the same problem of failing to
capture the magnitude of the drop in the interest rate in the normal state.
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2.4.5 Out-of-Sample Prediction Performance
Using the simulated time series data generated by the NK model described
above, I calculate, in this Section, the mean-squared prediction error (MSPE)
using the RBF estimator, VAR, and Bayesian VAR (BVAR).
The BVAR model was estimated with a prior that combines a Minnesota-
type prior (see [46]) with priors that take into account the degree of persistence
and cointegration in the variables as in [68]. When setting the tightness of the
prior, I chose a set of parameters suggested by [67]. Following [69], I restricted
the number of lags in the VARs and BVARs to be one and four, respectively.
When choosing the number of parameters in the RBF estimator (i.e. number
of centroids), I imposed a restriction that the number of the parameters does
not exceed the number of parameters used by the VAR(1) model. Within this
constrained parameter space, I chose the optimal number of parameters based
on the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). In the remainder of this Section, I
pretend that I observe only four variables in the simulated data, (i) inflation
rate pit, (ii) output Yt, (iii) interest rate Rt, and (iv) hours worked Nt. Define
zt = [pitYtRtNt], then the RBF model can be written as
zt =
M∑
j=1
Kλ j
(
ξ j, {zt−h}pp=1
)
β j + t (2.27)
where M, the number of centroids, is determined by the BIC, and K(·) is Gaus-
sian as specified in equation (2.4).
Table B.1 presents the mean and standard error of the Mean-Squared Predic-
tion Error (MSPE) for 1-, 2-, 4-, 8-, and 12-period step-ahead predictions. All
models are estimated using 1000 periods of observation (length of training set
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is 1000), and the number of forecast periods (testing periods) is 60. All mod-
els are reestimated each period. The overall measure of forecast performance is
the log determinant of the forecast error covariance matrix. The result is based
on 1000 Monte Carlo replications, and the standard errors are expressed in the
parenthesis.
As in Table B.1, the MSPE produced by the RBF is almost identical to the
results produced by the VAR(1) model. The performance deteriorates slowly
overall when the number of steps for step-ahead prediction increases in all mod-
els, and this is consistent with [69]. Somewhat surprisingly, the MSPE generated
by the BVAR(4) is greater than the other two estimators. Thus, with the training
set as large as 1000, the RBF estimator performs equally as well as the VAR(1)
and BVAR(4) in terms of the out-of-sample prediction errors.
The objective of this Monte Carlo simulation is to study the properties and
performance of the RBFs estimator when the data sample is small. I thus per-
formed the same MSPE comparison exercise with the length of training set equal
to 300 and 150. The results are reported in Table B.2 and Table B.3, respectively.
The results again are based on 1000 Monte Carlo replications.
Almost all the conclusions from Table B.1 still hold true with a smaller train-
ing set as observed in Table B.2 and Table B.3. Similar to Table B.1, the overall
measure of performance by the RBF and VAR(1) are very close to each other in
both Table B.2 and Table B.3. Given that the length of training set is now reduced
to 300 and 150, it is somewhat surprising that the overall measure of perfor-
mance did not decrease by a large amount. It might hint at the fact that the NK
model used for this simulation exercise was so simple that an observation set as
small as 300 and 150 is enough to capture the true structure of the economy. The
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results presented in Table B.2 and Table B.3 highlight the fact that the RBF esti-
mator is stable even when using the shorter training sets, and its out-of-sample
prediction performance is as good as the VAR(1) and BVAR(4) model even when
the length of the training set is as small as 300 and 150. The exercise here illus-
trates the potential applicability of the RBF estimator to macroeconomic time
series analysis.
2.5 Application to the US Data
In this section, I apply the RBF estimator to the US data. I will follow the dataset
studied by [69] but extend the dataset to include the fourth quarter of 2013. The
last four years of the dataset corresponds to the periods of the ZLB.
2.5.1 Data
[69] consider seven key quarterly macroeconomic US time series as observable
variables: (1) the log difference of real GDP, A, (2) real consumption, C, (3) real
investment, I, (4) real wage, w, (5) log hours worked, N, (6) the log difference
of the GDP deflator, pi, and (7) the federal funds rate, R. Consumption, real
GDP, real investment, and GDP deflator are obtained from Bureau of Economic
Analysis statistics. Hours are calculated by the average weekly hours for all
nonfarm business workers (PRS85006023) multiplied by the number of work-
ing population (CE16OV) adjusted for the change in labor force participation.
Finally, real wage is defined as hourly compensation for all nonfarm business
workers (PRS85006103) divided by the GDP deflator.
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2.5.2 Impulse Responses
In this section, I estimate the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables
to a positive standard deviation shock to utilization-adjusted TFP, which is mea-
sured by Fernald (SF Fed). I estimate the following equations:
Xt = RBF(
P∑
p=1
Xt−p) + ut,
where Xt = [∆At,∆Yt,∆Ct,∆It,∆wt,Nt, pit,Rt] and ut =
[
at , 
m1
t , 
m2
t , 
m3
t , 
m4
t ,
m5t , 
m6
t , 
m7
t
]′
. Thus, ut is a vector of reduced form errors. As I am interested
in only the TFP shock, I will use the block-recursive assumption suggested by
[19] to identify the effect of the TFP shock.
The results are shown in Figure 2.5. The dotted black line is point estimates
of the impulse responses using the linear VAR(2). The dotted blue and red lines
are the estimated impulse responses using the RBF estimator. As I need to spec-
ify exact timing of the shock for the RBF estimator, these responses are esti-
mated to begin in the year of 2005 (“normal state”) for the blue line and in 2008
(“zlb state”) for red line. The estimated responses of the TFP shock in panel (a)
quickly diminish after the period 1. There are two features of the results that
need to be highlighted. First, the estimated responses of the RBF estimators in
the normal state resemble the responses estimated by the linear VAR(2) with the
exception of inflation. This means that, as the linear VAR is expected to pick the
structure of economy in the normal state, the RBF estimators in the normal state
are capturing the responses of macroeconomic variables in the normal state as
intended. The fact the the impulse responses of the VAR(2) and those of the RBF
estimators coincide confirms the applicability of the RBF estimator in analyzing
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses of US Economy
(a) TFP (b) Consumption
(c) Inflation (d) Hours worked
the real US economic data. Second, the impulse responses of the output and
labor in the zlb state that are estimated by the RBF estimator clearly differ from
the responses in the normal state. In particular, the response of labor in the zlb
state seems to be much more persistent than the response of labor in the normal
state. This hints at the fact that the economy struggles to recover to their steady
state due to the inability of the monetary authority to use the interest rates to
mitigate the shock. The results suggest that the RBF estimator are capable of
capturing different impulse reposes of the macroeconomic variables in the zlb
state.
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2.5.3 Out-of-Sample Prediction Performance
This Section investigates whether the RBF estimator has a reasonable out-of-
sample prediction power even when the estimator is applied to the real US data.
For this purpose, I perform out-of-sample prediction performance comparison
of the RBF estimator with the VAR(1) and BVAR(4) models. All models are
estimated starting in 1955. The forecast period is 1999:1-2013:4, and all models
are reestimated each quarter. The overall measure of forecast performance is
the log determinant of uncentered forecast error covariance matrix. The result
is reported in Table B.4.
Some features of Table B.4 is noteworthy. First, the RBF estimator in general
performs poorly compared with the VAR(1) and BVAR(4) in terms of 1 quarter-
and 2 quarter-ahead prediction. In particular, the performance is notably worse
when predicting the values of investment and hours 1 quarter and 2 quarters
ahead. The MSPE obtained from the VAR(1) and BVAR(4) are almost identi-
cal in almost all dimensions, with VAR(1) performing slightly better, suggest-
ing that the estimator that has the best out-of-sample prediction power for this
dataset is the VAR(1). Even though the RBF estimator performs poorly in terms
of the prediction of a short time horizon, its performance improves markedly
and does equally as well as the BVAR(4) when predicting variables in 4-, 8-, and
12- quarters ahead. It is not clear what causes the RBF estimator performs rela-
tively well in a longer time horizon, but the results hint at the fact that the RBF
estimator has a reasonable predicting power in a long time horizon using the
real quarterly US data.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigated potential applicability of the Radial Basis Func-
tions to the macroeconomic time series variables. Based on a stylized New Key-
nesian model, I performed a number of Monte Carlo simulations to study a large
and small sample behavior of the RBF estimator. I found that the RBF estima-
tor can perform equally as well as the traditional time series estimators, i.e., the
VARs and BVARs in terms of the out-of-sample prediction. The RBF estimator
was also applied to the quarterly US macroeconomic time series data. The per-
formance of the RBF estimator is poor in terms of 1 quarter and 2 quarter ahead
prediction, but its performance improves and performs equally as well as the
VARs and BVARs when it comes to the 4-, 8-, 12-quarter ahead predictions. In
addition, I found that the RBF estimator can capture the quantitative and qual-
itative differences in the effects of a TFP shock depending on the timing of the
shock and economic environments when that shock occurs.
The results shown in this chapter highlights the potential benefit and valid-
ity of using the RBF estimator to study time series property of macroeconomic
variables. The future work includes the estimation of the government spending
multiplier using this RBF estimator.
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CHAPTER 3
MARKET SIGNALS AND THE COST OF CREDIT RISK PROTECTION:
AN ANALYSIS OF CDS SETTLEMENT AUCTIONS
3.1 Introduction
During the past decade, derivatives known as Credit Default Swap or CDS have
become one of the most actively quoted instruments in financial markets. In
particular, CDS spreads have mostly replaced bond prices to signal market sen-
timent vis-a-vis single borrowers, be these corporations or sovereigns. One im-
portant, and often quoted, feature of these instruments is that they help isolate
pure default risk of a single entity from other factors that may otherwise be af-
fecting the prices of its bonded obligations such as liquidity, market microstruc-
ture etc. The relatively lower administrative burden associated with CDS trades
have also made them a popular instrument in markets where other instruments
are often subject to registration requirements.
Market quotes of CDS “spreads” have become a common measure of default
risk. Based on market data, the pricing formulas allow estimating the implied
default probabilities of single borrowers. These may then enter the decision
making process of market participants and politicians alike. CDS spreads have
become widely followed by professionals seeking to extract signals from mar-
ket data on default probabilities, on liquidity conditions, and also on systemic
risk ([2]). The number of empirical studies making use of CDS data has grown
considerably in recent times, such as, [49], [74] and [22] among many others.
The objective of this paper is to study whether one of the assumptions
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made on the models generally used to estimate default probabilities using CDS
spreads is appropriate given postdefault data. We also use post-default data
to analyze whether the cost of credit risk protection quoted by the CDS market
prior to the default reflected appropriately the probability of default as esti-
mated using post-default data.
We thus compare the (risk-neutral) default probabilities calculated from CDS
spreads through standard valuation models with the probability of default cal-
culated using recovery rates as established by the final bond prices at CDS set-
tlement auctions. We find that adjusting the estimations of the implied default
probabilities for the actual recovery rates yields estimates of default probabili-
ties that are significantly different than those estimated using standard assump-
tions. The implication is that, if quoted CDS spreads are computed using stan-
dard expected values on recoveries, market participants may be paying too little
or too much for default protection than they would if the default probabilities
were estimated using actual recovery values received at the auctions.
Some recent studies analyze whether the recovery values established at the
auctions used to settle CDS claims are effective as mechanisms of price disclo-
sure on the bonds underlying the CDS swaps.1 We investigate the determinants
of what we call the “excess spread”, the difference we compute between the cost
of protection CDS buyers should have been paying given the final bond prices
and the actual CDS cost they were charged in the market. We observe “ex-
cess spreads” on the cross-section of default experiences where a CDS auction
was held. We conclude that large miss-matches between demand and supply of
bonds at the CDS settlement auctions may be biasing the final recovery prices of
1Examples are [18], who provide a theoretical model for the action process, and [23], [31],
and [29], who empirically compare bond prices prior to the auction with the actual auction
outcomes, sometimes including the bidding behavior at the auctions
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the bonds and thus generating the excess spreads. We also briefly discuss auc-
tion participants’ payoffs and possible strategic behaviors that may be driving
our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I briefly reviews the
main characteristics of CDS contracts, the settlement auction mechanism and
the main literature on credit event auctions. Section II describes the dataset and
the recovery outcomes. Section III presents the econometric methodology and
results. Section IV briefly draws some conclusions.
3.2 Brief Review of CDS Contract and How They Are Priced
The term “CDS” refers to an agreement among two parties for the exchange
of financial flows. One party agrees to pay a fixed pre-determined periodic
amount over the length of the contract. The other party agrees to pay a lump
sum only at the occurrence of a specified “credit event” of a third party nom-
inated in the contract (“Reference Entity”). For the contract to exist, the third
party or “Reference Entity” does need to have an outstanding obligation (“Ref-
erence Obligation”) in the form of a bond or a syndicated loan. The “credit
event” is legally defined in the CDS contract and encompasses different con-
cepts of a “default”.2 Neither party of the CDS contract needs to hold a “Ref-
erence Obligation” in order to enter in the CDS contract, however the financial
flows involved in the CDS contract replicate those generated by the holding of
securities. For this reason CDS are derivative instruments.
2There are several different concepts of “default” in the legal literature and CDS contracts
have evolved to incorporate different notions. The most common events are bankruptcy filings
or Chap 11 filings in the US, failure to pay, and restructuring. The legal definition of restructur-
ing in most complex and some CDS contracts effectively exclude restructurings.
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The cost of a CDS, or premium, may be expressed as an annual amount in
basis points.3 Contracts are usually written for standard maturities, which are,
most commonly, of one, three, and five years. Upon the occurrence of a default,
a “credit event determination” decision is made by a particular committee of the
International Swap and Derivative Association (ISDA) and the CDS settlement
procedure takes place through a special “protocol”. ISDA establishes the nature
of the credit event and the list of deliverable obligations. The securities eligible
for delivery are from a single class of debt (senior unsecured bonds, senior loans,
and subordinated bonds). The lump sum payment due upon the occurrence of
a credit event is set to be equal to the par value of an outstanding obligation
issued by the referenced third party, upon delivery of that obligation (or another
obligation of similar characteristics).
In the early days of CDSs, after the determination of a credit event, the set-
tlement of CDS contracts took place exclusively through the physical delivery
of the reference obligation in exchange of the payment of the full face value
amount. The payoff for the party holding the protection claim and the physical
obligation will be equal to the face value of the bond less the recovery amount of
the security in the market. The party offering the credit protection in exchange
for the premium payment would have a cash outflow equal to the face value of
the security but would be left holding an asset with a recovery value equal to
the market value of the security. The recovery value implicit in the CDS contract
(i.e. the value of the reference security after the event of default) was set entirely
3Following an ISDA standardization decision, in market quotes the cost of CDSs is many
times expressed by the sum of points paid upfront and a “running spread” which has been
standardized. For historical record keeping, data is stored in spread terms but the relationship
between points and spread is simply related through the standard ISDA model. In other words,
it is still possible to back out the “spread” from the points up front using the standard model
and standard recovery assumption. In this study we will refer to the “spread” as the cost of the
CDS they way it is kept in databases (rather than how it is quoted in the market) to simplify
comparisons and for reference purposes.
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on the value the protection seller was able to obtain from the security following
the settlement of the CDS contract.
However, as the market for CDSs developed, the value of outstanding CDS
far outstripped the outstanding stock of debt of the reference entities and this
caused issues and concerns at the time these claims had to be settled in the event
of default ([31]). The experience during the settlement of CDS contracts on Del-
phi in 2005 was particularly troublesome as the price of the defaulted bonds
increased after the event of default. This occurred because many “naked” pro-
tection buyers sought to source the scarce deliverable bonds in the secondary
markets. Not only did this give rise to distortions in the securities markets
but also yielded highly different payoffs to the different market participants
depending on the price they were able to source or sell the reference obligation
([31]).
Following such experiences, ISDA developed a process that aimed at avoid-
ing physical delivery by uniquely establishing the recovery value for the ref-
erence obligation and ensure equal payoffs across CDSs buyers.4 Once the re-
covery value is uniquely established, CDS contracts can be liquidated on a cash
basis without the need to recur to physical delivery.
The procedure developed by ISDA, or “protocol”, first entails a decision on
whether an entity has suffered a “credit event” and, following such determina-
tion, an auction of the bonds of the defaulted entity which are determined to
4ISDA has made efforts to harmonize procedures and practices with respect to CDS con-
tracts. It first developed a Master CDS Agreement to standardize contracts. Then, as of 2006,
ISDA instituted a protocol for CDS settlement. Whithin this protocol a special ISDA Committee
(the credit determination committee) assesses wether an event of default has taken place and
then publishes the procedures for the settlement of the claims and the list of deliverable obli-
gations. With the help of Creditex, it was decided that the recovery value for the purposes of
liquidation of CDS claims be established through an auction.
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be deliverable. In such auction, all market agents who hold both the security and
the protection claim and can participate by asking to physically deliver the secu-
rity to claim for the payment of the CDS. In addition, all those agents that have
sold protection and require physical delivery of the CDS to settle their dues can
ask to participate. All auction participants can require physical delivery of their
respective derivative position but no more than that. This implies that a protec-
tion holder that desires to settle physically through the auction can commit to
deliver no more bonds than those covered by his or hers CDS contracts. This fea-
ture is designed to ensure that only CDS buyers with bond holdings participate
in the auction and there will be no impact on bond prices from market players
needing to source short positions. However, this feature also limits greatly ac-
cess to the auction by interested parties that might otherwise submit buy or sell
orders depending on their estimates of the underlying bond value following the
auction.
The auction process occurs in two steps and is best illustrated in [20] and
[29], [18], [31]. In the auction process, potential bond buyers (CDS sellers) and
sellers (CDS buyers) place their price quotes for bid/offers for the deliverable
obligations and their volume requests for physical settlement.5 An initial mid
market point for the security’s price is established as well as a Net Open Inter-
est (NOI) for physical settlement requests.6 In a second stage, buyers and sellers
submit their limit orders for the security at the mid market point price. The or-
ders are filled beginning with the higher/lowest price depending on whether
the NOI was to buy/sell. The final price at which the NOI is exhausted is the
adjusted price for the reference obligation. All CDS claims of agents participat-
5The bids/offers contain a certain, pre-established bid/ask spread, and the size of the orders.
6The Net Open Interest (NOI) is the net volume of bid (+) and offers (-). That is the only
volume that is physically traded at the auction, as the rest is settled in cash.
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ing in the auctions are liquidated through the auction mechanism. All other
CDS contracts will be settled given the recovery value set at the auction for the
reference obligation.
3.2.1 Pricing CDS contract
To illustrate how the post-default recovery prices would influence the valuation
of CDS contracts if they were known, we review the basics of the CDS pricing
literature ([24], [38], [35], etc.). The CDS contract is identical to a forward sale,
by the CDS buyer, of the reference obligation at its face value: i.e. as if it was a
default free bond, on the occurrence of a credit event. The CDS buyer or “pro-
tection holder” has the right to receive the face value of the reference obligation
at a future undetermined date. The protection seller, who agrees to buy forward
the obligation as if it were default free, will require to be compensated along the
life of the contract for the potential payout it will have to face in the event of
a default. The payment he will require should be equivalent to the difference
between the market value of the defaulted security and its forward value. In
financial terms, the amount of the compensation for the financial risk the pro-
tection seller holds will have to be exactly equal to the difference in the yields
of a defaultable and default free security. Therefore, extent of the spread that
the protection seller will charge will depend on the risk-neutral probability of
default and also on the post default recovery value.
For the practical purpose of calculating the spread on a CDS contract, we
will also remember that the value of every swap must be zero at inception for
a market no-arbitrage condition. For this condition to hold, the present value
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of the stream of payments by the CDS buyer (protection holder) must be equal
to the present value of the lump sum payment of the CDS seller (protection
seller). As long as the reference entity survives, the CDS buyer will face a pre-
established flow of payments, the lump sum payment of the protection seller
will occur at an uncertain date and only if the reference entity defaults. We
adopt the framework developed by [24], [38], [35] and used by the Bloomberg-
developed software to derive the CDS pricing equation. Since these are the
most common valuation methods, it is most likely that pricing signals will be
extracted by using this methodology.
We note that the CDS buyer will be facing a constant stream of payments
S T , (the CDS spread) for the life of the contract (T ) as long as RE, reference
entity survives. If we assume that RE has a probability Pt of defaulting at time t
and a probability (1 − Pt) of surviving until t, the present value of the stream of
payments of the protection buyer over the life of the contract (T maturity of the
CDS contract) will be equal to:
PVProtection Payment = S T
T∑
t
(1 − Pt)
(1 + rt)
(3.1)
where rt is the risk free interest rate at time t.
In the event RE cannot honor its obligations, the protection seller will face a
lump sum payment of (1 − R), where R is the recovery rate expressed in percent
of par. Defining the probability of defaulting in each period t (discrete) as the
probability of default up to period t (Pt) conditional on the probability of having
survived until the period before (1 − Pt−1), it is then possible to express the net
present value of the lump sum payment of the protection seller in a discrete
time world as:
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PVPayout Payment = (1 − R)
T∑
t
(Pt − Pt−1)
(1 + rt)
(3.2)
Setting the value of the swap to zero, it is possible to derive the equation for
the spread of the T period CDS as:
S T = (1 − R)
∑T
t=1
(Pt−Pt−1)
1+rt∑T
t=1
1−Pt
1+rt
(3.3)
It is important to note that this equation has two unknowns, one is the proba-
bility of default up to period t and the other is the extent of the recovery rate
R.7
3.2.2 Evaluating Default Probabilities: Reduced-Form Models
The probability of default required for the pricing of the CDS can be modeled
as dependent on firms’ characteristics (as so-called structural models do) or can
be assumed to follow a certain stochastic process (as reduced-form models do).
Since structural models of the probability of default are quite complex and often
do not fit the data, it is customary in CDS valuation models, to use a reduced-
form model assuming as Poisson process with certain assumptions on the haz-
ard rate.8
7This specification can be easily be transformed for a continuous time environment, but for
purposes of our paper, which uses discrete time observations we maintain the discrete time
formulation.
8By far the most popular model is to assume that the probability of default is a Poisson
arrival process with a constant arrival rate. This implies that there is a constant default intensity
at every period in time and therefore to expressed as: Pit = exp−λt t where Pit is the probability that
entity i defaults at time t and λi is the risk-neutral constant hazard rate of entity i, modeled as
the arrival rate of a Poisson process. However, this expression entails the assumption that there
is a constant default risk to the entire term structure of the different maturities of the reference
entities outstanding obligations.
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In this study, we concentrate on entities that suffered an event of default.
Therefore, the common assumption that the hazard rate is constant does not ap-
pear to be appropriate in our case. For this reason, we model the (risk-neutral)
default probability using a flexible parameterization, used in a number of em-
pirical studies, which allows for a negative slope in the default probability con-
sistent with the intuitive structure for a distressed entity.
For the purposes of this study, we will make use of the formulation used in
[51] and [71] which consists of a special case of the functional form proposed by
Nelson and Siegel (1987) for the term structure of the default free discount rates.
This form is flexible enough to capture both upward and downward-sloping term
structure that may arise due to stress in the credit markets:
χi,n = αi + βi · (1 − exp−tn)/tn (3.4)
where χi,n is the probability of entity i of defaulting in each period n; tn is the
number of years until the cash flow at time n; αi + βi is the default rate of entity
i as t approaches 0; and the infinity maturity default probability is equal to αt.
Using the specification above it is possible to solve Equation (3.3) after mak-
ing an assumption on expected recovery rate R. In the most common formu-
lations used by market participants, the recovery rate is assumed to be a constant
fraction of par at any given period in time (see [12] CDSW function). It thus en-
ters the CDS pricing equation adjusted only for the time value of money. In
the most standard formulation it is typically assumed to take a value of 0.4.9
9It is important to note that there are other types of credit instruments, and in particular
LCDS. These are credit default swaps which use outstanding syndicated loans as reference obli-
gations. In the case of loans, the average recovery value as implied in most market software is
70 percent.
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This has been set in empirical applications on the basis of the average recovery
expectation, as estimated through a large dataset collected and published by
Moody’s on defaults and recoveries for rated companies ([66]). In this dataset,
the long term average of average loss rate on senior unsecured debt is around
60 percent. It is important to note that senior unsecured debt instruments are
the type of instruments which constitute the reference obligations in the CDS
contracts we are analyzing.10
3.3 Data and Empirical Methodology
In this paper we use data from CDS settlement auctions as coordinated and dis-
closed by ISDA between 2005 and 2014 and run by Creditex.11 In particular, we
use the final published prices of the deliverable bonds by “reference entities”,
and data on physical request settlements and the related net open interest (NOI
see above) at the auction. The auctions are administered by Markit and relevant
data is published by ISDA.12
In the period between 2005 and June 2014, auctions were held for 116 refer-
ence entities for which a credit event was established. There are 156 final auction
results, as for some entities more than one auction had to be conducted for dif-
ferent types of referenced obligations (and for different maturity buckets). Data
on final recovery prices are available for 93 unsecured notes (senior and subor-
10There are a number of papers that review CDS pricing results in light of stochastic recovery
rates and conclude that recovery assumptions are crucial for the actual market pricing of the
CDS contracts [21], [57] among others.
11As of July 2014.
12Details can be found at www.isda.org ([70]) and www.creditex.com ([20]).
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dinated bonds)13 and 24 first lien loan obligations.14 In 73 cases the credit event
was determined to be a bankruptcy, in 35 cases there was a failure to pay, and
the remainder 32 cases are restructurings.15
Figure 3.1: Recovery Rates at CDS Settlement Auctions
13To settle Senior CDS contracts.
14To settle LCDS (Loan CDS contracts).
15We consider restructurings as a “special” credit event because discussions on recoveries
have been taking place prior to the auction. We control for this in some of our empirical estima-
tions.
81
In the dataset described the average recovery price for senior bonds is
42.74,16 while for loans it is 51.47, both of which are consistent with standard
assumptions on recovery values in CDS valuation models. The data appears
also to be consistent with the common notion finance literature that restructur-
ings tend to yield higher recovery rates than outright defaults, including and
that recoveries on loans are higher than recovery on bonds.17 However, while
auctions held after “restructuring” credit events, yield significant higher out-
comes, on average, than bankruptcies, the standard deviation in the sample is
actually rather high.
Data published on the auctions on creditex website also includes the total
volume of physical settlement requests, divided in buy and sell orders, and the
corresponding net open position (NOI). In particular, we note that, out of the 156
auctions in our sample, 93 have a negative NOI, implying and interest to sell.
We also find that the NOIs are highly correlated (0.99) with the total volume of
physical settlement requests, suggesting that CDS settlement auctions tend to
be “one sided”. This is potentially a troublesome feature as auction results may
to tend be dominated by large demand and supply mismatches, as suggested in
[29], and as predicted by the theoretical models developed by [18] and [23].18
16Prices are expressed in percent of par.
17Such outcome is consistent with the legal nature of the instrument since loans are normally
secured but bonds are unsecured.
18The high correlation between NOI and physical settlement requests could be a factor in [29]
estimations, who find no significant impact of the NOI with respect to the final bond prices in
the auction. In addition their sample is limited to 20 observations.
82
Figure 3.2: Senior CDS Spreads and Recovery Rates
One year maturity contracts on the day of the credit event
3.3.1 Credit Risk Protection Payments and Implied Default
Probabilities
We are interested in the analyzing link between market expectations on default
probabilities which determine the CDS spreads prior to the event of default and
the actual fair value of default protection as computed from ex-post recovery
rates established at the auctions. As a first step, we plot the distribution of the
CDS spreads with one year maturity vis-a-vis the final prices of the deliverable
bonds at the auctions. This is shown in Figure 3.2. By the nature of the rela-
tionship between CDS spreads and recovery rates, we would expect that close
to the event of a default, (and for any given default probability) there would
be a strong negative relationship between CDS spreads and recovery rates: one
would expect to observe higher default probabilities associated with low recov-
ery values and lower default probabilities associated with high recovery val-
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ues. However, this does not seem to hold for the sample under consideration
and there appears to be quite a number of occasions where very low values of
recovery rates are associated with very low CDS spreads.
We take another point of view. Since all of the CDS data points in the sam-
ple are companies that experienced an event of default observed on the day
the credit event was announced, the implied default probabilities should be
uniformly high for all the post-default actual recovery rates at the observed
spreads. The actual distribution of estimated default probabilities suggests that
the market at times has been ‘surprised’ by the default because lower than av-
erage recovery rates were experienced when pre-default CDS spreads were low,
implying the expected default probabilities were very low.
Figure 3.3: Implied Default Probabilities One-Year Ahead
Estimated on the day of the credit event using actual recoveries
The commonly held belief that high risk companies CDS’ “trade at recov-
eries” does not appear to hold on the basis of post-default recoveries, since,
should that be true, for any given spread, the probability of default should be
relatively high for ex-post recovery rates on defaulted companies. On the con-
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trary, a significant amount of data points seems to suggest that, ex-post, the
expected probability of default was relatively low.
To analyze the extent of the “surprise” in each credit event, we assume that
market expectations are formed using standard recovery rates.19 Therefore the
spreads should reflect the expected probability of default at the standard re-
covery rates. To gauge the extent to which the probability of default implied
by the recovery rates at the auctions differs from the probability of default that
would be implied by market quoted spreads at standard assumptions, we use
the theoretical relationship between CDS spreads and expected recovery rates
(Equation 3.3) to compute ex ante implied probabilities of default. We assume
that the CDS spreads on the day of the credit event reflect the best informed de-
fault expectations by market participants and that these expectations are formed
using average recovery rates on senior unsecured bonds found in [66]s publica-
tions therefore imply a recovery value of 0.4. Thus, the expected (risk-neutral)
T -years ahead probability of default on the day of the credit event (which we
assume is at a maximum) is obtained by solving for Pt,exp given by:
S T
T∑
t=1
1 − Pt,exp
1 + rt
= (1 − 0.4)
T∑
t=1
(Pt,exp − Pt−1,exp)
1 + rt
(3.5)
The term structure of the market quotes for CDS spreads (S T ) allow to com-
pute the marketimplied default probability, as commonly done in empirical lit-
erature, solving recursively for the probability of default one-year ahead, three-
year ahead etc. (Turnbull, 2003) with a socalled bootstrapping methodology.20
Following this practice, we computed the marketimplied default probability
19Were standard recovery rates are based on historical experiences as published by Moodys
and other rating companies.
20This is also the standard procedure followed by Bloomberg Corp.
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one-year ahead, using data on one year maturity CDS contracts. We use the
estimated value for the one year ahead default probability to extract the three
year ahead market-implied default probability, and so forth.
We also apply an alternative methodology, as presented in [71], which re-
quires estimating the parameters of a reduced form model for the default prob-
ability (Equation 4).21 We estimate parameters and for each entity that suffered
a credit event, under the assumption all market participants have the standard
expectation of a 0.4 recovery rate. Both methodologies follow the advice in [25],
of using the entire term structure of the hazard rates when estimating default
probabilities. We will use both estimations of the implied default probabilities
to check for robustness of our results.
We repeat both the estimations using CDSs spreads observed at dates prior
to the event of default and final bond prices at settlement auctions as actual
recovery rates. We compare the estimated market-implied default probabil-
ity consistent with standard signal extracting methodologies with the default
probability we would have estimated from the CDS spreads if the final recov-
ery prices form the settlement auctions had been known. We observe how, the
default probabilities extracted actual recovery are significantly different with
respect to the apriori default probabilities.22
To analyze these patterns we chose to compare how different are the mar-
ket quotes for CDS observed prior to the event of default with those computed
assuming that market participants would have known the actual recovery rates at the
21The alternative methodology assumes a default probability distribution, (so called a
reduced-form models), and use the observations on term structure of CDS spreads to estimate
the corresponding parameters.
22T-stats on pair wise comparison strongly reject the hypothesis of equal means with 99 per-
cent confidence level and reject the hypothesis of same variances at the same significance level.
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Figure 3.4: Implied Default Probabilities Estimated Using Average and Actual
Recoveries
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The red dots in Figure 3.4 depict the probability of default as calculated by applying a standard reduced-form
model to actual quoted CDS spreads and using the final auction prices as recovery values, while the blue crosses show
the implied probability of default extracted under the assumption of average recovery rates. We extend the analysis of
the default probabilities to different CDS maturities to extract the ‘one-year-ahead’, ‘three-year-ahead’ and ‘five-year-
ahead’ probability of default. We repeat the calculations, for one week prior, one month prior and one year prior to the
credit event date.
auctions. In other words, we calculate the value the protection payments should
have had to ensure that, at the inception of the swap, they would have been
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commensurate with the actual payouts following settlement auction.
We assume that the expected default probability distribution use to calculate
the fair value CDS spread will be the same for the observed CDS market quotes
and for the recovery values at the auction date. Therefore we can use the quoted
CDS spreads over the term structure and the actual recovery rates given the
default probability structures estimated from market-quoted spreads.23
The final auction prices for the deliverable bonds at the auctions will deter-
mine the value of the payment leg of the swap ex-post. This will allow us to
compute the CDS spreads that would have been quoted by the market if the re-
covery values of the auction (RA) were known, under the assumption that the
markets default probability expectations prevailing prior to the event of default
fully reflected all information on the defaulting entity except for the auction
results.
S i,pytR = (1 − RA)
∑T
t=1
(Pt,exp−Pt−1,exp)
1+rt∑T
t=1
1−Pt,exp
1+rt
(3.6)
Since the risk-neutral default probabilities are basically a discount weight for
the expected recovery rate at the end of the swap period, the difference between
the actual CDS spreads and the payout CDS spreads (S pytR) should mainly reflect
the difference between actual and expected recovery rates.
If market participants had expected an average recovery rate, we would ex-
pect that the difference between the CDS spreads calculated using the payment
23The estimated implied default probabilities would be risk-neutral. As these would be the
probability of default that would ensure and investor would need to be compensated for to be
indifferent between a defaultable and a default-free bond. A wide literature seeks to introduce
risk aversion in investor preference and therefore estimate a real world default probability, but
this is beyond the scope of our investigation.
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leg (average recovery rates) and the payout leg (final auction recovery rates)
would distribute randomly around a zero mean. This should follow the market ef-
ficiency hypothesis, as all information about expected outcomes should be fully
reflected in market prices.
We use the data on actual recoveries at the auctions and quoted CDS spreads
for one, three and five year maturities quoted on the reference entities at the
day of the credit event available in DataStream, Markit and Bloomberg.242526
We include discount factors from four geographical regions in our dataset that
are identified by the ‘Determination Committee’ at the ISDA as the ones where
the predominant trading currency of each reference entity is associated with.
These four regions are the U.S., E.U., Great Britain, and Japan. Based on this
geographical information, we retrieved one-to-five year risk-free interest rates
associated with each reference entity’s region from Datastream.
We would expect, a priori, that the relative difference between prices of de-
fault protection as calculated before and after a credit event, should follow a
random distribution centered on a zero mean, if the standard expectations for
recovery rates were based on historical averages. However, we find significant
skewness and kurtosis in our sample of recovery rates to reject the normality hy-
pothesis.27 In CDS valuation terms this implies that the value of the protection
leg differs systematically from the value of the payment leg.
We then ask whether the differences in the calculated costs of credit protec-
24It is important to note that the reference date for the calculation is the credit event date as de-
termined by ISDA determinations committee and not the day of the auction, as that follows the
credit event date by about three weeks. We do not have quoted data for CDS spreads following
the credit event date.
25www.markit.com
26As there are very little quoted spreads data on LCDS (Loan CDS) and CDS related to sub-
ordinated debt, our dataset is restricted to 83 observations, only.
27See appendix with Summary Tables.
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tion before and after the auction still hold for the week, the months and the year
prior to the credit event. We thus repeat the same comparison, by using CDS
market quoted spreads observed at several dates before the credit event dis-
counting the recovery rate for the appropriate time frame, up to one year before
the credit event.
3.3.2 Explaining Auction Outcomes
We use the implied probabilities of default computed above to estimate S pytR,T,i,t,
the CDS spread that would have prevailed if recovery rates had been known
at the prevailing default probabilities. We compute this for the one, three and
five year CDS contract maturities. We concentrate in particular on the one year
adjusted spreads at the date of the credit event as we are interested in observing how
well market signals from CDS spreads were anticipating the near-term outcome.
We repeat the estimations for all CDS maturities at a number of dates prior to
the credit event and up to a year before the credit event.
We define ∆S T,i,t as ∆S T,i,t =
S prtR,T,i,t−S T,i,t
S T,i,t
, the “excess spread”, as the relative
difference between the protection payments we estimated should have pre-
vailed on the basis of the expected default probabilities and the actual recovery
rates and the actual CDS spreads prevailing prior to the event of default (S T,i,t).
We expect that the estimated difference in the spreads will reflect the impact of
the actual and expect recovery rates on the implied probability of default and
thus give us a measure of the accuracy of the ex-ante market signal as compared
to ex-post auction outcomes.
The in-sample properties of the excess spread suggest a non-zero mean (See
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Appendix C.2) and a significant skewness. We investigate whether factors at
play during the auction may be generating a systematic bias in recovery prices.
We conjecture that the excess in spread could be driven both by characteristics of
the auction itself and by CDS market and general market sentiment factors that
may not have been fully reflected in the CDS prices. In particular, as suggested
by [29] and [23] liquidity of the auction itself could be a main driver of the
auction prices.
We thus include: (i) a measure of liquidity of the auction itself ([29]; [23], (ii)
proxies for market sentiment and the macroeconomic outlook (iii) measures of
liquidity of the CDS market for the defaulted entity, (iv) proxy of expectations
about the potential future gains from the bonds.28
The absolute value of the NOI with respect to the total physical delivery
requests can be a good proxy for liquidity as it measures the extent of the miss-
match of demand and supply as a share of the size of the market. Our NOI
index is thus constructed as the total NOI at the auction as a share of the total
sum of bid and offers. The index will be constrained between -1 and +1. We
expect that negative values of the index (where the NOI is to sell) will be asso-
ciated to higher excess spreads (because the lower than expected bond prices
will require higher CDS spreads). By contrast, lower and negative values of the
excess spread should be associated with either small mismatches or a NOI to
buy which would potentially drive auction prices above market expectations.
This is actually reflected by the in-sample correlations (See Appendix C.2).
We include controls to proxy for liquidity in the CDS market for the de-
faulted entities: (i) the number of CDS contracts outstanding on the day of the
28The list of variables and definitions is included in the Appendix C.1.
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credit event, and (ii) the share of netnotional values of CDS to gross notional
values on the day of the credit event, this is a measure of liquidity in the CDS
market for the entity.29 This share provides a measure of how many times the
CDS contracts have been re-sold in the market, given a certain notional out-
standing.30
We also include controls to proxy for general markets sentiment at the time
of the auction that could be influencing recovery prices, in particular: the CBOE
volatility index (VIX) as a proxy of the amount of risk aversion in the system
at the time of the credit event; the total amount of defaults per year, as proxy
for recessions and the general business cycle;31 the prevailing 3 month libor
rates at the time of the credit event, a proxy for the monetary policy stance;
and, the US 5 year zero coupon rates at the time of the credit event, a proxy
for long term expectations about the state of the economy.32 We also include a
variable to account for market expectations about the possibility of recovery of
the defaulted entity.33
29The Gross notional values of CDS outstanding registered in DTCC have been declining as
accounting for CDS positions has improved. We consider that taking the share of Net notional
values to Gross notional values avoids then problem generated by the structural trend.
30The weekly data can be retrieved from Trade Information Warehouse Report on Deposi-
tory Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) website. However, these data are available for only
the top 1000 reference entities in terms of trading volume each week. As a result, we have 59
observations for these proxy variables for CDS markets’ liquidity.
31Total number of Chap.11 filings per year, in Datastream
32For the US, UST zero coupon yield were used, for the EU, EU vs EONIA zero swap rates
were uses, for Japan and UK, zero coupon rates bonds were used. Data for interest rates,
bankruptcies, as well as VIX were all obtained from DataStream.
33One way to do this is to include the 5-year CDS spreads in the set of regressors. How-
ever, directly including 5-year CDS spread as a regressor might yield spuriously significant
results, since the 5 CDS spreads also depend on the 1 year spreads. To address this concern,
we first regress 5-year CDS spread on 1-year CDS spread and 3-year CDS spread as specified:
y5 CDS spreadt = α0 + α1 · y1 CDS spreadt + α2 · y3 CDS spreadt + controlst + ωt. The resulting
residuals represent a variation in 5-year CDS spread that is independent of all the information
contained in 1-year CDS spread and 3-year as well as other control variables such as NOI in-
dex, defaults per year and sector fixed effects. We use this residual, ωt, as a proxy for long-run
default probability that is independent of short-run default probability.
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Finally, we construct a categorical variable that identifies industrial sector of
each reference entity. This sector-specific variable was constructed by retrieving
two-digit NAICS code for each reference entity. In our dataset, each entity falls
into one of the following 15 industries.34
Our empirical specification is the following:
∆S T,i,t =
S prtR,T,i,t − S T,i,t
S T,i,t
= β0 + β1 · NOIIndexi,t + β2 · Risk Aversiont
+ β3 · Controli,t +
5∑
s=1
γs · Industrial Sectori,s + T,i,t
We call ∆S T,i,t the excess spread that would be necessary to add to market
quoted rates to ensure that two legs of the CDS are appropriately valued af-
ter accounting for actual recovery rates. T indicates the maturity of the CDS
contract, t the time at which the spreads are observed, i is the defaulting refer-
ence entity indicator. We concentrate on the auction characteristics (NOIindex)
as our main explanatory variables because we assume that all market available
information is already reflected in the CDS quoted prices. We conjecture that
if the final recovery rate has a systematic bias, this may signal the presence of
strategic behavior by auction participants.
We use ordinary least squares and include fixed effects at the industry level,
fixed effects for the year of default, and we adjust for clustered standard errors.
34(i) Administrative and Support Services, (ii) Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, (iii) Con-
struction, (iv) Finance and Insurance, (v) Information, (vi) Management of Companies and En-
terprises, (vii) Manufacturing, (viii) Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction, (ix) Pro-
fessional, Scientific, and Technical Serivices, (x) Other Services except public administration (xi)
Public Administration, (xii) Real Estate and Rental and Leasing, (xiii) Retail Trade, (xiv) Trans-
portation and Warehousing, (xv) Utilities.
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Results of the estimations are reported in Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.3536
Table 3.1: Determinants of Excess Spreads - Baseline REgressions
Dependent Variable: ∆S 1,CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NOIindex -0.410*** -0.352*** -0.354*** -0.333*** -0.195** -0.300***
(0.0559) (0.106) (0.0787) (0.0853) (0.0854) (0.0576)
VIX 0.0178** 0.0162* 0.0155** 0.0155**
(0.00646) (0.00751) (0.00630) (0.00529)
Constant -0.146*** -0.460*** -0.646*** -0.730*** -0.405* -0.532***
(0.0135) (0.0671) (0.178) (0.214) (0.181) (0.135)
FE (Auction Year) No Yes No No No No
FE (CDS region) No No No Yes No No
FE (Industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 72 72 59 84
Sample 1/2/ Senior CDS Senior CDS Senior CDS Senior CDS Excl. Restr. Full Sample
R-squared 0.205 0.401 0.368 0.396 0.257 0.270
Adjusted R-squared 0.193 0.314 0.349 0.360 0.230 0.252
1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * denotes probability level p¡0.10; ** p¡0.05; and *** p¡0.01”. Estimations
using reduced form probability structures, and robust standard errors. See Appendix C.2 for variable sources and
definitions. 2) Dependent variable, excess CDS spread, one year maturity: (S prtR,t − S t)/S t
Notes: The baseline regressions are shown in Table 3.1. Dependent variable: excess spreads at one year maturity
computed using reduced form probability structures. In column (1) the excess spread is regressed on the NOIindex
for the sample of auctions on senior bonds, including fixed effects included only for the industry of belonging of the
defaulting entity;(2) include fixed time effects for the year of default; (3) includes a control for market volatility at the
time of default and makes which makes the inclusion of time effects not necessary; (4) includes regional effects for CDS
markets; (5) excludes all those credit events that occurred as a result of a restructuring decision between the defaulting
entity and its creditors; (6) includes the auctions on subordinated bonds.
We find that our NOIindex has a large negative association with the excess
spread, which is statistically significant at conventional levels. This requires
some interpretation. It is important to remember that a positive NOI suggests
that the volume of demand for the defaulted bonds is in excess of the supply,
the reverse when it is negative. A positive excess spread suggests the payment
leg of the CDS underestimated the ex-post the recovery rates at the auctions, or,
35A formulation of the dependent variable in logarithmic formulation was tried, all signifi-
cance was maintained.
36Results presented are for excess spreads computed using reduced form probability struc-
tures. The same regressions were also run with excess spreads computed using bootstrapped
probabilities; the results did not change significantly.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Excess Spreads - Additional Controls
Dependent Variable: ∆S 1,CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NOIindex -0.359*** -0.352*** -0.413** -0.416*** -0.351*** -0.352*** -0.250*** -0.248***
(0.0899) (0.0722) (0.154) (0.112) (0.0779) (0.0792) (0.0731) (0.0141)
VIX 0.0194* 0.0176** 0.0123 0.0112** 0.0172** 0.0175** 0.0130 -0.0103
(0.0100) (0.00701) (0.00789) (0.00454) (0.00616) (0.00632) (0.00856) (0.0179)
default year -0.000385
(0.00161)
3 month libor 0.00525
(0.0289)
N.CDS contracts -0.0000
(DTCC) (0.00001)
NetNotional 1.064
Index (2.063)
Zero coupon -2.059
5 year rates (4.275)
Default prob. 0.120
5 year ahead (instr.) (0.194)
Avg Price -0.00587**
Bonds (0.00209)
Price 1 year -0.00602
Bonds (0.00447)
Constant -0.643*** -0.646*** -0.434 -0.493 -0.675*** -0.638*** -0.162 -0.242
(0.163) (0.175) (0.342) (0.269) (0.185) (0.173) (0.352) (0.447)
FE
(Auction Year) No No No No No No No No
FE
(CDS region) No No No No No No No No
FE
(Industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 48 48 72 72 53 32
Sample 1/
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
R-squared 0.370 0.368 0.356 0.360 0.369 0.370 0.566 0.699
Adjusted R-squared 0.342 0.340 0.312 0.317 0.341 0.342 0.539 0.654
1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * denotes probability level p¡0.10; ** p¡0.05; and *** p¡0.01”. Estimations
using reduced form probability structures, and robust standard errors. See Appendix C.2 for variable sources and
definitions. 2) Dependent variable, excess CDS spread, one year maturity: (S prtR,t − S t)/S t
Notes: Table 3.2 shows results of regression assessing robustness of the baseline regressions controlling for omitted vari-
ables. Dependent variable: excess spreads at one year maturity computed using reduced form probability structures.
All regressions are run on the sample of auctions on senior bonds. For variables definitions see Appendix C.1.
95
Table 3.3: Estimation Using Five-year Ahead Implied Probabilities of Default
Dependent Variable: ∆S 5,CE ∆S 5,CE ∆S 5,CE ∆S 5,CE ∆S 1,CE−1y ∆S 1,CE−1y ∆S 1,CE−1y ∆S 1,CE−1y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NOIindex -0.399*** -0.323** -0.343*** -0.324*** -0.416*** -0.357** -0.384*** -0.329***
(0.0541) (0.106) (0.0795) (0.0850) (0.0685) (0.116) (0.0846) (0.107)
VIX+ 0.0178** 0.0163* 0.00956*** 0.0162**
(0.00643) (0.00744) (0.00201) (0.00735)
VIX 1y# 0.00442 -0.00681
(0.00784) (0.00792)
Constant -0.148*** -0.466*** -0.647*** -0.719*** -0.148*** -0.438*** -0.523* - 0.550
(0.0131) (0.0706) (0.176) (0.208) (0.0152) (0.0560) (0.243) (0.484)
FE
(Auction Year) No Yes No No No Yes No Yes
FE
(CDS region) No No No Yes No No No No
FE
(Industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 72 72 76 76 76 76
Sample 1/
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
R-squared 0.196 0.399 0.359 0.380 0.195 0.378 0.261 0.434
Adjusted R-squared 0.184 0.311 0.341 0.343 0.184 0.294 0.230 0.229
1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * denotes probability level p¡0.10; ** p¡0.05; and *** p¡0.01”. Estimations
using reduced form probability structures, and robust standard errors. See Appendix C.2 for variable sources and
definitions. 2) Dependent variable, excess CDS spread, one year maturity: (S prtR,t − S t)/S t , 3) +: VIX at the auction date,
4) #: VIX at the CDS spreads observation date
Notes: Table 3.3 shows regressions assessing robustness by using as a dependent variable the excess spread computed
for five year maturity CDS contracts on the day of the credit event and the same excess spread observed a year before
the credit event on the sample of auctions for senior bonds.
ex-post, the probability of default should have been higher, a negative excess
spread suggests the contrary. Empirical evidence suggests that at the auctions
with significant sell interest (negative NOI) the excess spreads tend to be higher
(positive ∆S T,i,t) and thus actual bond prices were below market expectations.
By converse, when the volume of demand is greater than supply (positive NOI),
a negative impact suggest that excess spread reduces (negative ∆S T,i,t), as final
bond prices tend to be above standard market expectations and, ex-post, the
probability of default should have been lower. The estimated coefficients sug-
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Table 3.4: Estimations Using Excess Spreads at Different Dates
Dependent Variable: ∆S 1,CE−1m ∆S 5,CE−1m ∆S 1,CE−1y ∆S 5,CE−1y
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NOIindex -0.366*** -0.345*** -0.412*** -0.425***
(0.0935) (0.102) (0.0819) (0.0755)
VIX 1m+ 0.0149** 0.0152**
(0.00517) (0.00517)
VIX 1y+ 0.00473 0.00489
(0.00583) (0.00589)
Constant -0.555*** -0.563*** -0.273 -0.266
(0.145) (0.145) (0.153) (0.153)
FE
(Auction Year) No No No No
FE
(CDS region) No No No No
FE
(Industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 76 76 76 76
Sample 1/
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
Senior
CDS
R-squared 0.269 0.254 0.190 0.201
Adjusted R-squared 0.249 0.234 0.168 0.179
1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * denotes probability level p¡0.10; ** p¡0.05; and *** p¡0.01”. Estimations
using reduced form probability structures, and robust standard errors. See Appendix C.2 for variable sources and
definitions. 2) Dependent variable, excess CDS spread, one year maturity contracts: (S 1prtR − S 1t)/S 1t and excess CDS
spreads on five year maturity contracts: (S 5prtR − S 5t)/S 5t . 3) +: VIX at the auction date
Notes: Table 3.4 presents estimation results for the determinants of excess spreads when calculated on CDSs for one year
and five year maturity contracts, observed the month and the year preceding the credit event. The same regressions
were run with three year maturity contracts, results were not significantly different.
gest that an increase in the size of the NOIindex by 1 would reduce the size of
the excess spread by around 30 percent. As an example, an auction for a bond
of a defaulted entity where the NOIindex is to sell would experience an excess
spread 30 percent higher than an auction with the same magnitude NOIindex
but an interest to buy. A qualitative change in the structure of the auction (from
sell to buy) at the same magnitude of volumes and NOI generates significantly
higher recovery values.
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This result suggests that large miss-matches between supply and demand
appear to be affecting prices at the auction, and that the minority group at the
auction will see a bias of prices in its favor. Such results appears to be in line
with the claim in [29] that illiquidity at the auctions is biasing final recovery
prices, where illiquidity is seen as the lack of buyer/sellers, so that, in order
to “win the action”, bids and offers are biased.37 We also find evidence that
market sentiment (VIX) is important at the time of default, and with the right
sign: the higher the market volatility at the time of default, the lower the recov-
ery prices with respect to expectations. However, the impact of interest rates
and the broader macroeconomic outlook are limited. This result is in line with
the expectation that information known to market participants prior to the auc-
tion should have influenced the CDS quote and therefore should not have any
impact on auction prices. Interestingly, none of the indicators of liquidity in the
CDS markets appears to have any influence on the spread differential. This sug-
gesting that the total volume of physical delivery requests is completely inde-
pendent of the overall micro-structure of CDS market for each defaulted entity.
Finally, the variable to control for the expected price of the bond after final
bankruptcy procedures was significant if taken as an average of observed prices.
However, the price of the bonds of one year remaining maturity was not signif-
icant when clustered errors were used, likely because of significant dispersion
in the data.
37Their study focuses on the difference between deliverable bond prices prior and after the
auction and the auction final prices. We assume that part of that difference has to be reflected in
the implied default probability as calculated prior to the auction and using the auction results.
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3.3.3 Discussion of Results
The question remains open as to why auctions tend to display relatively large
NOIs and in particular, why they tend to be NOIs to sell. One possible explana-
tion is that relative payoffs of bidders and sellers at the auctions with respect to
their bond and CDS positions has a tendency to generate sell NOIs. We suggest
that the auction structure tends to reduce the number of potential bond buyers
and therefore yields sell NOIs.
This is better discussed when thinking at the different payoffs generated by
the decision between cash settlement and physical delivery. A CDS seller that
chooses to settle physically will place a buy order. After the auction he will face
payments for 100 on his CDS positions will be delivered bond with an auction
price of R. Assuming he sits through the bankruptcy proceedings and in final
liquidation is awarded a cash payment of Fr, his total payoff from choosing to
settle physically will be equal to the difference between the auction recovery
value and the final payout after bankruptcy or resolution the credit event.38 A
CDS seller will thus choose physical delivery only those occasions in which she
expects that after the auction i.e. for example bankruptcy proceedings, the pay-
out will be higher than the auction price.39 If she expects that auction prices will
be close to the final payout value of the bond, she will be indifferent between
physical delivery and cash settlement, and thus might not enter the auction. If
the CDS seller believes that the final liquidation value will be lower than the
auction price, then she would be better off by not choosing physical delivery and
38Actually, not all credit events imply bankruptcy procedures to follow the auction. Indeed
a significant number of them are connected to restructuring decisions. While we use the lan-
guage “final payout” here, it is intended to refer to the expected value the obligation will have
following the auction.
39The reasoning is not different if we assume there is a secondary market for the defaulted
bonds after the auction has taken place and CDS sellers can sell their bond.
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simply paying 100-R in cash settlement.
A CDS buyer that chooses to physical delivery needs either to own or to
source the bond to sell at the auction. If she settles in cash she will then receive
a payout in the size of the net loss after default (100-R). The only cases in which
the CDS buyer will secure a higher return from not participating in the auction is
when she expects the price of the auction to be lower than what she will receive
from final payout or lower than the market price at which she can source the
bond.
To summarize the strategies, the optimal behavior for CDS sellers would be
not to join the auction at all unless there is an expectation that final liquidation
values are significantly above the auction prices.40 Similarly, the only cases in
the CDS buyer will not participate in the auction will be if the auction price
established at the auction is lower than the purchasing value of the bond and/or
the final payout price. So CDS buyers will participate in the auction if they
expect final payout values to be lower than the auction prices but CDS sellers
will not.
Auction behavior
As both CDS buyers and sellers will tend to go long or short the physical
bond at the same time, there will be a tendency of the auction to reflect the
expectations of the market in terms the final bond payout values. Should the
market, on average, expect low payout values, then the a NOI will be to sell, by
contrary if market expectations are for high payout values then the NOI will be
40The CDS seller that does join the auction has an interest in securing low auction recovery
prices, she has no interest minimizing her CDS payout because only what she expects to get after
the auction, will determine her bidding at the auction. The actual final price of the action R does
not enter the total payoff
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to buy. This could explain why NOIs at the auction tend to be highly correlated
with the auctioned volumes, as market expectations on the final liquidation val-
ues reduce the amount of auction participants.
If we assume that expectations on final liquidation values distribute normally
in the market, with the expected value being the median and the mode of
the distribution, then, at each auction, only a minority of agents will be tak-
ing different views from those prevailing in the market. Therefore, for any
given expected final liquidation value agents with the majority view will tend
to over/under bid, in order to “win” the auction. This behavior would be in
line with the theoretical models of [18], [23]. So that, eventually, the minority of
buyers/sellers that have expectations different from the rest of the market will
be able to achieve an auction price in the direction that will ensure they have a
positive payoff by participating in the auction.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing empirical research on the auctions used to
settle CDS positions following the occurrence of a credit event. We have found
evidence that the difference between actual and expect recovery rates on the
required CDS spreads, given default probability expectations, would yield to a
systematic bias in the ex-ante market signal of implied probabilities of default.
This implies that, should CDSs pricing in the market follow standard modeling
and assumptions, there has been a systematic bias in the valuation of the two
legs of CDS contracts when compared with the ex-post recovery values of the
bonds at the auctions.
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We have analyzed the difference in valuations between the two legs of the
CDS contract by calculating the excess spread that should have been charged
on the basis of the actual recovery rates and expected default probabilities as
signaled by market prices prior to the credit event. We have found that both the
size of the Net Open Interest at the CDS settlement auction and market senti-
ment in general tend to have a significant impact on the size of the excess spread.
In particular, we find that the NOI at the auctions is inversely associated with
the size of the excess spread, suggesting that large miss-matches between sup-
ply and demand at the auctions tend to bias auction prices. Our findings are
consistent with the evidence in [29] who find that final auction prices of the de-
liverable bonds tend to be below their pre- and post auction fair market values.
We explain this result by analyzing the payoffs of the CDS sellers and buyers
at the credit event and we conclude that the nature of the strategies is such that
auctions tend to be “one sided” and therefore to “win” the auction the bids will
tend to come in below or above the target price depending on the sign of the
net open interest. In addition, we conjecture that the buy side interest at the
auction will tend to be limited both because of the particular specialized nature
of investors in defaulted bonds and because of the auction’ own regulations.
These preclude potential bonds buyers from entering the auction absent a sell
CDS position. CDS sellers that chose not to settle physically a lower than the
fair value prices choose to incur such a loss to avoid withstanding bankruptcy
proceedings but thus face higher than expected payouts.
Several interesting avenues for future research remain open. One is to iden-
tify a fully fledged model for auction behavior along the lines of [18] and Du-
Zhu (2013) that includes the expectations on the final payout from bonds and
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CDS positions after the auctions in the reaction function of market agents. The
other is to extend our analysis using data on actual CDS spreads (rather than
quoted spreads) as charged and valued by market dealers. Should our results
be confirmed, the auction mechanism might need to be rethought, especially if
there are significant volumes of CDS sold which are settled in cash because the
protection sellers are not active in managing their portfolios and may have little
incentive in participating in post-auction bankruptcy procedures.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX
A.1 Data Description
Throughout the analysis, I used the Japanese Household Panel Survey (JHPS)
and the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS). The original datasets include
approximately 4000 households between 2004 to 2008 and 8000 households be-
tween 2009 and 2014. I focus on the income of sub-sample of the household-
heads who were recorded at least 4 times. This criterion leaves us with about
2000 samples each year from 2004 to 2008 and about 3200 samples from 2009 to
2013.
The survey records the labor income of household-heads under the follow-
ing four categories: (i) monthly wages, (ii) weekly wages, (iii) hourly wages,
and (iv) annual bonuses. I construct an estimated hourly wages based on all
four measures of the wages.
The monthly wages and annual bonuses are converted into hourly wages by
the following procedure:
hourly wages =
monthly wages + annual bonuses / 12
(average days worked per month/4.381 weeks) × hours of work per week
The denominator is the hours worked per month, which is estimated using
the reported average days worked per month, the average number of weeks in
a month (4.381 weeks), and the reported hours of work per week.
The weekly wages are converted into hourly wages by the following proce-
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dure:
hourly wages =
weekly wages
hours of work per week
A part of the job-tenure is also estimated for the analysis. The survey asks
respondents the year in which they started the current employment. From this
figure, I calculate the job tenure. However, this question is available only when
the respondents enter the survey for the first time. For the following years, I
add a year to the job tenure if the respondents reported that they stayed at the
same workplace from previous year. Otherwise, I set the job tenure to 0.
The work experience is constructed in a similar manner. The number of
years working is reported only when the respondents are recorded in the sur-
vey for the first time. From this, I add a year to the work experience if the
respondents reported that they worked in the following years. Otherwise, the
work experience in each survey year remains the same as the previous year.
A.2 Stationary Inducing Transformation
This section shows the derivation of the stationary inducing transformation
and that the value functions are homogeneous of degree one in X. Let vari-
ables in tilde indicate the variables before the stationary-inducing transforma-
tion. Without loss of generality, I assume no human capital accumulation,
pi j = 0 for j ∈
{
perm, temp, u
}
, and no outside wages for permanent workers.1
The system of value functions before conducting the stationary-inducing trans-
1Under this assumption, the permanent firms incur firing costs as soon as firms and workers
meet at the initial period of employment.
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formation is:
U˜(h) =b˜ + β(1 − ν) maxE
[
U˜′perm(h), U˜
′
temp(h)
]
(A.1)
U˜perm(h) = f (θperm)(W˜perm(h) − U˜(h)) + U˜(h) (A.2)
U˜temp(h) = f (θtemp)(W˜temp(h) − U˜(h)) + U˜(h) (A.3)
J˜perm(h) =h × X − w˜perm(h) + β(1 − ν)E
[
(1 − δperm)J˜′perm(h) − δpermφ˜′
]
(A.4)
J˜temp(h) =A × X − w˜temp(h) + β(1 − ν)E
[
(1 − δtemp)J˜′perm(h)
]
(A.5)
˜κperm =β(1 − ν)E
[
q(θperm)
∫
h
J˜′perm(h)dµhperm
]
(A.6)
˜κtemp =β(1 − ν)E
[
q(θtemp)
∫
h
J˜′temp(h)dµhtemp
]
(A.7)
w˜perm = (1 − η)b˜ + η
(
h × X − β(1 − ν)(1 − δperm)φ˜′
)
(A.8)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)
{
f (θperm)(W˜ ′perm(h) − U˜′(h))
}
w˜temp = (1 − η)b˜ + η (A × X) (A.9)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)
{
f (θtemp)(W˜ ′temp(h) − U˜′(h))
}
To derive a system of equations that are on the balanced growth, I divide
all variables by X. I assume that X exhibits a steady-state rate of growth de-
noted by γX, γX = X′/X. Furthermore, I also assume that all exogenous variables
grow at the constant rate of γX: b = b˜/X, φ = φ˜/X, and κ j = κ˜ j/X. Under these
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assumptions, the system of equations (22)-(30) can be written as follows:
U(h) =b + β(1 − ν)γX maxE
[
Uperm(h),Utemp(h)
]
(A.10)
Uperm(h) = f (θperm)(Wperm(h) − U(h)) + U(h) (A.11)
Utemp(h) = f (θtemp)(Wtemp(h) − U(h)) + U(h) (A.12)
Jperm(h) =h − wperm(h) + β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δperm)Jperm(h) − δpermφ
]
(A.13)
Jtemp(h) =A − wtemp(h) + β(1 − ν)γX E
[
(1 − δtemp)Jperm(h)
]
(A.14)
κperm =β(1 − ν)γX E
[
q(θperm)
∫
h
Jperm(h)dµhperm
]
(A.15)
κtemp =β(1 − ν)γX E
[
q(θtemp)
∫
h
Jtemp(h)dµhtemp
]
(A.16)
wperm = (1 − η)b + η
(
h − β(1 − ν)(1 − δperm)γXφ
)
(A.17)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
f (θperm)(Wperm(h) − U(h))
}
wtemp = (1 − η)b + η (A) (A.18)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
f (θtemp)(Wtemp(h) − U(h))
}
Thus, the system of equations are are homogeneous of degree one in X.
A.3 Wage Determination
As explained in Section 1.5.9, a wage is negotiated between a worker and a firm
according to the Nash Bargaining. The two parties split the match surplus as
follows: For a new permanent worker
(1 − η)(WNperm − Uperm) = ηJNperm (A.19)
For an existing permanent worker
(1 − η)(WEperm − Uperm) = η(JEperm + φ) (A.20)
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And for a temporary worker
(1 − η)(Wtemp − Utemp) = ηJtemp (A.21)
I derive the wage for a new permanent worker here. To derive the wage
equation, I first write out the value functions in the equation A.19 using the
value functions defined in sections 1.5.5, 1.5.6, and 1.5.7:
(1 − η)
(
wNperm + β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piperm)(1 − δperm)
(
(WEperm(h, z) − U(h)) + U(h)
)
+ piperm(1 − δperm)
(
(WEperm(h + ∆h, z) − U(h + ∆h)) + U(h + ∆h)
) }
− b − β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piu)
(
f (θperm)(WNperm(h, z) − U(h)) + U(h)
)
+ piu
(
f (θperm)(WNperm(h − ∆h, z) − U(h − ∆h)) + U(h − ∆h)
) })
= η
(
yNperm − wNperm
+ β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piperm)((1 − δperm)JEperm(h, z) − φδperm)
+ piperm((1 − δperm)JEperm(h + ∆h, z) − φδperm)
}
Using the expression in equation A.20, I can simplify the expression above as
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follows:
⇒
wNperm − (1 − η)b − η(yNperm − R f ′(k))
+ β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piperm)(1 − δperm)
(1 − η) (WEperm(h, z) − U(h)) − ηJEperm(h, z)︸                                                  ︷︷                                                  ︸
ηφ

+ piperm(1 − δperm)
(1 − η) (WEperm(h + ∆h, z) − U(h + ∆h)) − ηJEperm(h + ∆h, z)︸                                                                       ︷︷                                                                       ︸
ηφ

+ (1 − η)
(
(1 − piperm)Uperm(h) + pipermUperm(h + ∆h) − (1 − piu)Uperm(h) − piuUperm(h − ∆h)
)
− (1 − piu) f (θperm)ηJNperm(h, z) − piu f (θperm)ηJNperm(h − ∆h, z)
}
= 0
Finally, the wage equation for a new permanent worker can be written as
follows:
wNperm = (1 − η)b + η
(
yperm − β(1 − ν)γX(1 − δperm)φ
)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(piperm − piu)U(h) + piuU(h − ∆h) − pipermU(h + ∆h)
}
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piu) f (θperm)(WNperm(h) − U(h))
+ piu f (θj)(WNj (h − ∆h) − U(h − ∆h))
}
One can follow the same steps to derive the wage equation for an existing
permanent worker:
wEperm = (1 − η)b + η(yperm + (1 − ηβ(1 − ν)γX(1 − δperm))ηφ)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(piperm − piu)U(h) + piuU(h − ∆h) − pipermU(h + ∆h)
}
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piu) f (θperm)(WNperm(h) − U(h))
+ piu f (θj)(WNj (h − ∆h) − U(h − ∆h))
}
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Likewise, the wage equation for a temporary worker can be derived as fol-
lows:
wtemp = (1 − η)b + η(ytemp)
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(pitemp − piu)U(h) + piuU(h − ∆h) − pitempU(h + ∆h)
}
+ (1 − η)β(1 − ν)γX
{
(1 − piu) f (θtemp)(WNtemp(h) − U(h))
+ piu f (θtemp)(WNtemp(h − ∆h) − U(h − ∆h))
}
A.4 Computation
The computation algorithm for the model with exogenous separation is ex-
plained in this section. There is only one state variable, which is workers’ skill-
level, h. Because workers are heterogeneous only in their skills, workers with
the same skill all search in the same market in the steady state.
The computation algorithm is explained as follows:
1. Guess, for all h, the market in which the workers with skill level h search
for a job
2. Guess U(h) for each skill level, h.
3. Solve for J and w using Equations 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.17, 1.18, and 1.19.
4. Solve for θ and the steady-state skill distributions of workers using Equa-
tions 1.12, 1.13, and 1.20.
5. Solve for W using Equations 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8.
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6. Verify that guess of U(h) satisfies Equations 1.4 and 1.5 for all skill levels,
h,.
- If not, update the guess, and return to step 3. Otherwise, proceed to
step 7.
7. Verify that initial guess of market that workers with skill, h, search satisfies
Equation 1.3
• If not, update the guess, and return to step 1. Repeat until conver-
gence.
A.5 Calibration strategy for No Human Capital Accumulation
Economy
Table A.1 summarizes the target moments for calibrating the model in an econ-
omy that prohibits endogenous skill accumulation. The task of the procedure is
to find values of the five parameters, φ, b, m¯perm, m¯temp, and A in order to match
five moments. The estimated parameter values are listed in Table A.2.
Table A.1: Targets and Model Moments
Moment Data (Target)
Model
Output
Job finding rate 0.155 0.1585
Ratio of job finding rate: perm/temp 0.450 0.4496
Job separation rate 0.0035 0.0033
Share of temporary worker 0.080 0.0937
Average wage ratio: perm/tem 1.681 2.2272
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Table A.2: Internally calibrated parameters
Variable Description Value
φ Firing cost 0.0375
b Unemployment income 0.4500
m¯perm Matching efficiency in the permanent sector 0.1461
m¯temp Matching efficiency in the temporary sector 0.2353
A Productivity of temporary worker 0.5335
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Table B.1: Out-Of-Sample Prediction Performance (training set = 1000)
Inflation Output Interest Rates Hours Overall
VAR(1)
1q 0.0182 0.0078 0.0010 0.0077 -41.5178
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.1294)
2q 0.0182 0.0083 0.0017 0.0079 -40.5194
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0731)
4q 0.0184 0.0086 0.0026 0.0080 -39.6020
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0325)
8q 0.0186 0.0096 0.0034 0.0076 -39.1550
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.1605)
12q 0.0177 0.0096 0.0032 0.0077 -39.2795
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.1784)
BVAR(4)
1q 0.0234 0.0091 0.0011 0.0085 -40.3015
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.2258)
2q 0.0249 0.0097 0.0018 0.0090 -39.0538
(0.0022) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.2431)
4q 0.0243 0.0107 0.0029 0.0094 -37.9293
(0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.2926)
8q 0.0239 0.0130 0.0046 0.0089 -37.1638
(0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.2680)
12q 0.0231 0.0132 0.0056 0.0091 -37.3261
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0248)
RBF
1q 0.0181 0.0079 0.0011 0.0078 -41.3677
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1885)
2q 0.0182 0.0085 0.0018 0.0079 -40.4801
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.1386)
4q 0.0184 0.0086 0.0027 0.0080 -39.5777
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0614)
8q 0.0186 0.0097 0.0034 0.0076 -39.1760
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.1819)
12q 0.0178 0.0095 0.0031 0.0077 -39.3235
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.1716)
Notes: All models are estimated using a training set whose length equals
to 1000. The forecast period is 60. All models are reestimated each period.
Standard errors are expressed in parenthesis. The result is based on 1000
Monte Carlo replications. The overall measure of forecast performance is
the log determinant of uncentered forecast error covariance matrix.
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Table B.2: Out-Of-Sample Prediction Performance (training set = 300)
Inflation Output Interest Rates Hours Overall
VAR(1)
1q 0.0195 0.0065 0.0009 0.0073 -42.0027
(0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.4161)
2q 0.0199 0.0065 0.0015 0.0074 -41.1171
(0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.3627)
4q 0.0197 0.0074 0.0023 0.0073 -40.2211
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.3805)
8q 0.0199 0.0094 0.0033 0.0074 -39.4600
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.3201)
12q 0.0198 0.0103 0.0040 0.0070 -39.2506
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.3372)
BVAR(4)
1q 0.0259 0.0082 0.0010 0.0090 -40.2729
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.3259)
2q 0.0242 0.0077 0.0017 0.0093 -39.5032
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.2875)
4q 0.0252 0.0083 0.0025 0.0100 -38.4665
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.4022)
8q 0.0240 0.0095 0.0033 0.0103 -37.8527
(0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.3532)
12q 0.0257 0.0102 0.0039 0.0095 -37.6182
(0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.2969)
RBF
1q 0.0195 0.0065 0.0010 0.0073 -41.9674
(0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.3040)
2q 0.0200 0.0064 0.0015 0.0074 -41.1195
(0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.3435)
4q 0.0197 0.0075 0.0023 0.0073 -40.2164
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.3655)
8q 0.0199 0.0095 0.0033 0.0073 -39.4685
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.3184)
12q 0.0197 0.0103 0.0039 0.0070 -39.2797
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.3357)
Notes: All models are estimated using a training set whose length equals
to 300. The forecast period is 60. All models are reestimated each period.
Standard errors are expressed in parenthesis. The result is based on 1000
Monte Carlo replications. The overall measure of forecast performance is
the log determinant of uncentered forecast error covariance matrix.
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Table B.3: Out-Of-Sample Prediction Performance (training set = 150)
Inflation Output Interest Rates Hours Overall
VAR(1)
1q 0.0200 0.0069 0.0010 0.0076 -41.5672
(0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.4227)
2q 0.0207 0.0071 0.0016 0.0077 -40.6143
(0.0025) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.5469)
4q 0.0205 0.0079 0.0026 0.0075 -39.8262
(0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.8014)
8q 0.0210 0.0102 0.0039 0.0076 -38.8626
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.9597)
12q 0.0210 0.0116 0.0044 0.0075 -38.6125
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0004) (1.1208)
BVAR(4)
1q 0.0235 0.0084 0.0011 0.0094 -40.1687
(0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.2358)
2q 0.0235 0.0089 0.0018 0.0099 -39.0100
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.1639)
4q 0.0256 0.0095 0.0029 0.0096 -38.0164
(0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.1994)
8q 0.0249 0.0121 0.0042 0.0105 -36.9108
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.3895)
12q 0.0239 0.0138 0.0055 0.0105 -36.7386
(0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.5416)
RBF
1q 0.0203 0.0069 0.0010 0.0076 -41.5123
(0.0024) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.4225)
2q 0.0209 0.0071 0.0017 0.0077 -40.5892
(0.0024) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.5609)
4q 0.0207 0.0079 0.0026 0.0075 -39.7940
(0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.8044)
8q 0.0213 0.0102 0.0039 0.0076 -38.8302
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.9390)
12q 0.0216 0.0116 0.0044 0.0075 -38.5569
(0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0004) (1.0927)
Notes: All models are estimated using a training set whose length equals
to 150. The forecast period is 60. All models are reestimated each period.
Standard errors are expressed in parenthesis. The result is based on 1000
Monte Carlo replications. The overall measure of forecast performance is
the log determinant of uncentered forecast error covariance matrix.
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Table B.4: Out-Of-Sample Prediction Performance (US data)
Consumption Investment GDP Hours Inflation Wage FedFund Overall
VAR(1)
1q 0.74 1.87 0.72 0.48 0.22 0.99 0.14 -11.19
2q 1.42 4.13 1.43 1.08 0.22 1.15 0.22 -6.53
4q 2.71 9.23 3.05 2.45 0.27 1.36 0.38 -1.59
8q 4.84 17.54 5.78 4.55 0.34 2.03 0.66 3.12
12q 6.36 23.32 7.70 5.75 0.36 2.66 0.86 4.49
BVAR(4)
1q 0.70 1.92 0.71 0.55 0.21 1.05 0.13 -11.06
2q 1.33 3.97 1.29 1.09 0.21 1.27 0.24 -6.20
4q 2.46 8.47 2.62 2.32 0.25 1.52 0.41 -1.36
8q 4.46 16.30 4.93 4.25 0.30 2.39 0.68 3.73
12q 6.26 22.31 6.90 5.45 0.31 2.98 0.88 5.80
RBF
1q 0.78 2.69 0.86 1.12 0.25 1.01 0.19 -9.08
2q 1.38 5.02 1.48 1.59 0.27 1.18 0.33 -5.30
4q 2.33 9.18 2.59 2.41 0.31 1.46 0.54 -1.52
8q 3.89 16.01 4.47 3.83 0.35 2.17 0.76 3.76
12q 5.93 21.75 6.34 5.19 0.38 2.73 0.92 5.93
Notes: All models are estimated starting in 1955. The forecast period is 1999:1-2013:4. All models are
reestimated each quarter. The overall measure of forecast performance is the log determinant of uncentered
forecast error covariance matrix.
B.2 Numerical solution of nonlinear NK model
The algorithm for the numerical solution of the model is given below. There are
two loops in the algorithm. The outer loop iterates over the grid, and the inner
loop iterates over policy functions.
Step 0a: Solve the log-linear version of model and simulate data. This step is nec-
essary at the very initial stage because clustering methods in Step 1 choose
the grid using a sample of data points.
Step 0b: Defining the grid and the polynomials of the RBF. Given the simulated
data, construct a grid and the associated RBF polynomials of the policy
functions following [50].
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Step 1: Computing integrals. Compute the integrals using the [50]
Step 2: Equilibrium conditions. Start with a guess for the model’s policy functions.
For each grid points, use the polynomials obtained in Step 1 to compute
the values of future variables, [pit+1(S˜ ),Yt+1(S˜ ), Ft+1(S˜ )]. Given the future
variables, solve for the endogenous state variables next period using the
model’s equilibrium conditions.
Step 3: Evaluate conditional expectations. Using the integrals computed in Step 1,
evaluate the conditional expectations in equations 2.18, 2.24, 2.25.
Step 4: Evaluate new policy functions. Given the conditional expectations, ob-
tain the new values of future variables in the current period,
[pi′t(S˜ ),Y
′
t (S˜ ), F
′
t (S˜ )], using equations 2.18, 2.24, 2.25. Given these new val-
ues, compute the new policy functions, and compute the difference be-
tween the polynomials of newly obtained policy functions and those of
old policy functions. Denote the percentage difference as r.
Step 5: Iteration. If r < 10−8, go to Step 6. Otherwise, update the guess and repeat
Step 1-5.
Step 6: Compute new grid. Using the solution obtained in the previous steps, sim-
ulate new data. Using these simulated data, choose a new grid using [50].
Compute the difference in Euclidean norm between the old grid and the
new grid. Specifically, for each newly computed grid point, find the near-
est point in the old grid and compute the Euclidean distance. This forms
a vector, D, that contains the distances between each new grid point to its
nearest point in the old grid. Find the maximum of D and call it rg.
Step 7: Iteration for grid. If rg is smaller than the Euclidean distance between the
farthest two points in the old grid, stop the algorithm. Otherwise, go back
to Step 2 with the new grid obtained in Step 6.
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B.3 Accuracy of numerical solution
I check the accuracy of the numerical solution by computing the errors of the
residual equations. Specifically, I proceed as follows. First, I simulate the model
forward for 10,000 periods. This gives a simulation for both the state and con-
trol variables of the model for 10,000 periods. Second, compute the residuals
from the intertemporal equations 2.18, 2.24, 2.25 for 10,000 periods. I report the
decimal log of the absolute value of these residual errors.
On average, residual equation errors are on order of -3.94 for equation 2.18,
-4.90 for equation 2.24, and -3.44 for equation 2.25. These numbers are compa-
rable to the other studies whose models have similar degrees of complexity.
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Figure B.1: Residual equation errors
(a) Equation 2.18 (b) Equation 2.24
(c) Equation 2.25
Notes: The histograms report the residual equation errors in decimal log basis. The dotted red lines mark the mean
residual equation errors.
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Table C.1: Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
y1cdsce
1-year maturity CDS spread observed
on the day of the credit event
y1cds1y
1-year maturity CDS spread observed
1 year before the credit event
NOI Net Open Interest: bid - ask
NOIindex Normalized index of NOI : NOI/(bid+ask)
VIX
Volatility index of the US stock market
on the day of the credit event
VIX 1y
Volatility index of the US stock market
1 year before the credit event
default year
Number of defaulted firms in a year
when the auction is held
default prob.
5 year ahead
Estimated probability of default
in five years (see footnote 33)
3 month labor
3-month libor observed
on the day of the credit event
NCDS contract
Number of outstanding CDS contracts
in the week of the credit event
NetNotional
Index
Outstanding amount of net-notional values divided by
gross-notional values in the week of the credit event
Zero coupon
5 year rate
“Risk-free” interest rate on the 5-year maturity
US Treasury Bill on the day of the credit event
Avg. Pr. Bnds
Average price of quoted bonds
on the day of the credit event
Pr. 1y Bnds
Price of 1 year residual maturity bonds
on the day of the credit event
CDS region
Dummy variable, =1
if the region is associated with the reference entity
Auction Year
Dummy variable, =1
if auction is held that year
Industry
Dummy variable, =1
if the industry is associated with the reference entity
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics
obs Mean Std. Dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis
∆S 1,CE 90 -0.030 0.119 0.014 -3.875 20.667
∆S 3,CE 90 -0.028 0.099 0.010 -3.047 14.332
∆S 5,CE 90 -0.028 0.093 0.009 -2.586 11.112
NOI 156 -362.12 2212.9 489710.0 -8.224 72.027
NOIindex 142 -0.198 0.714 0.510 0.530 1.889
3 month libor 160 1.148 1.307 1.707 1.794 5.199
VIX 160 28.093 13.058 170.518 0.823 2.953
No CDS contracts
(DTCC) 79 1873.2 1466.2 214976.0 1.567 5.721
NetNotional Index 79 0.083 0.037 0.001 1.545 6.442
Table C.3: Selected Correlations
Physical
sttlm req. NOI NOIindex
NetNotional
Index
Net
Notional
Gross
Notional
No CDS contr
(DTCC) VIX
Physical
sttlm req. 1
NOI -0.9976 1
NOIindex -0.1117 0.1319 1
NetNotional
Index -0.1469 0.1429 -0.1781 1
Net
Notional 0.1159 -0.0859 -0.1411 0.0116 1
Gross
Notional 0.1569 -0.1309 -0.0989 -0.2826 0.8672 1
No CDS contr
(DTCC) 0.2494 -0.2305 -0.1261 -0.3032 0.8833 0.892 1
VIX -0.0516 0.0495 -0.2629 0.19 0.1096 0.0096 0.0411 1
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